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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 
Volume 19 2002 Special Edition Number 2 
Eighth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture 
on Environmental Law 
Environmental Law in the Political 
Ecosystem - Coping With The 
Reality of Politics 
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER* 
Humans are animals that are political. 
Aristotlet 
I. Introduction: A Caveat and a Political Proposition 
Caveat: Much of the following disquisition is based upon a legal 
war story, with all the dangers that implies. The kind people who 
invited me to present this year's Garrison Lecture were warned 
that I would be deeply enmeshed this sabbatical year in the pro-
ject of finally writing, after twenty-plus years, a book about an 
endangered species case in which my students and I, for six years 
in the 1970s, had the privilege and frustrating burden of repre-
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; J.D. Yale Law School; S.J.D. 
University of Michigan Law School; A.B. Princeton University. I am grateful to my 
colleagues at Pace University Law School for their invitation to deliver this Garrison 
Lecture essay, and delighted to have been able to sneak into the lineup of such an 
eminent assemblage of predecessors. Thanks to David Cole, Justin Surber and Jer-
emy McDiarmid for assistance on resources and citations. All errors are mine. 
t Aristotle, The POLITIKA, or POLITICS, Book 1 Part 2 (BC 350), paraphrased, 
without legitimate expertise, in order to achieve freshened context and gender 
neutrality. But compare the alternative paraphrase of this Aristotelian epigram infra 
at p.487. 
423 
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senting a two-and-a-half inch fish. The case is Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill et af.1 which pitted the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity's final dam, the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River, 
against a diminutive endangered fish, the snail darter. 
But the snail darter case apparently has assumed something 
of the character of a classic. In a recent national on-line poll of 
environmental law professors seeking a consensus on America's 
ten most significant environmental protection court decisions, 
TVA v. Hill was ranked number one, receiving almost twice as 
many votes as the runners-up.2 More than any case I know of, it 
serves as a figurative microtome3-an analytical slice of life 
presenting hundreds of individuals and dozens of legal and 
governmental institutions in interesting and revealing ways. It 
taught me and my students a great deal during the years we car-
ried it on, and continues to teach us as we look back at it. Fortu-
nately-although ultimately we lost the fight, the ill-considered 
dam was built and the darter's river valley habitat that was a na-
tional treasure is forever lost-the fish still lives on today in sev-
eral transplanted populations as a merely "threatened" species. 
Less fortunately, and in part ironically because the fish survived, 
the name of the fish is still invoked as an example of grossly mis-
guided, extremist, unnecessary, and illegitimate environmental 
regulation. 
The snail darter controversy serves as a useful political case 
study because it reverberates with stark political overtones as 
well as legal meaning. The case-often depicted, even by environ-
1. 437 U.S. 153 (1978), affg 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977) rev'g 419 F. Supp. 753 
(E.D. Tenn. 1976), (hereinafter TVA v. Hill). As noted here in the text and later, I was 
privileged to be petitioner and attorney in the snail darter case over six years in the 
courts up through the Supreme Court, in the agencies, and in its legislative process. 
An illustrated slideshow and background account of the endangered fish-dam litiga-
tion is available online at http://www.law.mercer.edulelaw/zygplater.html, and is 
drawn upon in parts of this essay. (Copy on file with Pace Environmental Law 
Review.) 
2. See Posting of James Salzman, salzman@Wcl.american.edu, to envlawprofs@ 
darkwing.uoregon.edu (Oct. 26,2001) (copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Re-
view). The second-ranked nominations were Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.s. 837 (1984) and Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976). It should be emphasized that the polling ranked the judicial decisions, not 
necessarily the efforts of the attorneys who argued them. 
3. A microtome is a scientific instrument that shaves thin slices of material from 
sampled objects in order to make laboratory slides that can be viewed through a mi-
croscope, revealing the objects' fundamental components, structures, and internal 
processes. 
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mentalists,4 as The Most Extreme Environmental Case There 
Ever Was-has been nationally notorious almost from the start of 
the litigation in 1974. Twenty years later the snail darter 
resurfaces regularly in news commentary and editorials, congres-
sional floor speeches,5 and Rush Limbaugh's diatribes against en-
vironmentalism.6 Moreover, because the merits of the fish/dam 
4. See, e.g., John Marks, Special Report: The Return of the Kennedys: Struggling 
Against Conservatives and Cynics, A New Generation of Activists Tries to Assert Itself, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 2, 1996, at 42. 
5. 143 Congo Rec. S9411, (daily ed. Sep. 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee) 
("Controversy has surrounded the law, however, since its passage. In the mid 1970's, 
the law became ensnarled in a bitter fight over the construction of the $900 million 
[sic] Tellico Dam and the dam's impacts on the hapless snail darter."); 142 CONGo REC. 
H10501-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (Tribute to the Honorable James H. Quillen on 
his retirement from Congress) ("And Jim [was] persuaded that the fish could get 
along just as well whether the dam was there or not"); 141 CONGo REC. S6423-02 
(daily ed. May 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Packwood) (''We do not care if the snail 
darter disappears"); 137 CONGo REC. S7848-01 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (statement of 
Sen. Johnston) ("Ask hardworking voters to sacrifice in the name ofthe snail darter, 
and, if they are feeling polite, they will give you a shrug"); 136 CONGo REC. H7508-06 
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Delay) ("Because the rabid environmen-
talists felt it was more important to jeopardize the lives of our brave American ser-
viceman than risk the death of a single snail darter."). 
6. "America today is a new homosocialism, communism. What these people are 
is against private property rights. They are trying to attack capitalism and corporate 
America in the form of going after timber companies. And they're trying to say that 
we must preserve these virgin trees because the spotted owl and the rat kangaroo and 
whatever live in them, and it's the only place they can live, the snail darter and 
whatever it is." Rush Limbaugh, The Rush Limbaugh Show (Infinity radio broadcast, 
Dec. 7, 1993). 
The snail darter case has likewise been used as an example of nonsensicallitiga-
tion in a much more Olympian setting by one of our most prominent savants of juris-
prudence. In LAw's EMPIRE, myoId professor Ronald Dworkin gets virtually all the 
facts of the case wrong, then bitterly criticizes Chief Justice Burger's decision for en-
forcing the statute on its terms and refusing to allow the district judge or the Justices 
to do what Professor Dworkin thinks preferable: to forge judicial adjustments to stat-
utes to effectuate what the judge or Justices believe to make better sense. Here too 
the snail darter may serve as a canary, warning us of the dicey legal process hazards 
lying within the coal mine of Professor Dworkin's propositions. See Ronald D. Dwor-
kin, LAw's EMPIRE 20-23, 314-354 (1988). 
In March of 2002, the keywords "snail darter" brought up 256 hits in a Lexis-
Nexis search of press articles from around the nation over the past two years-most 
often pejorative references to the fish and its environmentalist friends. See, e.g., Pat-
rick Buchanan, On the Record with Greta Van Susteren, (Fox television broadcast, 
Feb. 8, 2002), Transcript # 020805cb.260 ("If the snail darter is a species that's dying 
out, people are concerned ... [w]hy would they not be concerned that European peo-
,pIes who have created the greatest civilization in history, are dying out and will be a 
tiny fraction of two percent or three percent of the world's population by the end of 
this century?"); John Guffey, Editorial, SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 27, 2002 ("Of 
course, birds, snail darters and other assorted wildlife are worth more than human 
beings in our distorted minds."); Hold Your Breath, Suckers, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2002 
("Farmers, industrialists and conservatives fume that the ESA has become a way for 
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juxtaposition continue to be understood 180 degrees backward 
even by most environmentalists, it seems worthy of a retrospec-
tive look. 
Proposition: In this essay, the proposition I want to draw from the 
narrative of the endangered species litigation is derivatively Aris-
totelian-that we must consciously, actively, and explicitly inte-
grate an informed consideration of human politics into what we 
teach and do in environmental law. The proposition is not that we 
should steep ourselves in party politics, although there are inter-
esting observations aplenty that could be made on the direct 
consequences that the two major parties (and occasionally their 
wistful smaller incarnations) have on the evolution of envi-
ronmental law. Nor do I want to address Bush Jr.-Cheney or 
Clinton-Gore politics, nor Reagan-Bush Sr. or Carter-Mondale 
politics, although there are interesting views and consequences 
there, too. Nor politics within the judicial process, because that is 
a phenomenon that we professors already know how to discuss 
with our students. 
Rather I'd like to explore some political realities in the admin-
istrative and legislative process that my students and I learned 
for the first time from our intense experience of our particular 
case, realities that may well be familiar to most of this audience 
but nevertheless deserve explicit acknowledgment and thought 
about how we teach and use them. 
The proposition offered here operates at two different levels: 
• practical politics-it is essential to us as legal educators that 
we explicitly acknowledge and help our students understand 
the structures, contexts, and maneuverings of politics in the 
daily practice of environmental law-because many law stu-
dents have only a naIve eighth grade civics book comprehen-
sion, or less, of how the governmental and human systems 
they are entering really work, 
and further, by extension, 
• political overview-that inevitably we should define for our-
selves, and help our students define for themselves, some 
overall schematic political constructs, some ways to picture 
the structures of societal governance, so that we and they 
can have a working personal and professional sense of where 
environmentalists to enlist such previously obscure creatures as the spotted owl and 
the snail darter in anti-business campaigns."). 
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environmental law and lawyers fit within the overall 
scheme. 
This proposition, especially in its latter portion, risks the crit-
icism that it is just a mite grandiose. But it reflects the fact that 
most of us in this field believe environmental law is different from 
other fields of law. It is a jurisprudence that pegs its operational 
daily standards and processes not only on the present moment-
on this fiscal year, or this Administration, or this decade, or on the 
lifetime of any individual-but on the long term quality and sus-
tainability of human life within the richly interconnected complex-
ity of all the other systems that make up our Spaceship Earth. 7 
And in terms of human governance, most of us in this field have 
repeatedly discovered that, if you scratch away at the surface of 
almost any issue or controversy in environmental law, pretty soon 
you will be looking at some of the very most fundamental ques-
tions of democratic government. 
Environmental law has long played the role of the little kid 
pointing to the Emperor's bare tush that no one dare mention. We 
force power players to acknowledge the reality that acid rain and 
global warming truly exist, that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1872 
continues to be a scandalous giveaway, that nonpoint sources of 
water pollution and secondary National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) are important but evaded, that chlorinated 
hydrocarbons do not simply disappear but instead travel far in the 
atmosphere and in our own bodies' hormone systems,8 and so on. 
But it is useful to identify our own speak-not. In our own reluc-
tance to acknowledge the ubiquitousness of politics we too are em-
perors. In the present generation of environmental law, whatever 
it is,9 we are excruciatingly hesitant to acknowledge that an ex-
plicit exegesis of political factors and forces is a necessary part of 
virtually all environmental law analyses, part of how we frame 
7. "We travel together, passengers on a little spaceship, dependent on its vulner-
able resources of air and soil, all committed for our safety to its security and peace, 
preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work, and, I will say, the love we 
give our fragile craft." Adlai Stevenson, Address at the United Nations, 1965. 
8. THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FER-
TILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL?-A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (Plume 1997). 
9. Is this the third generation of environmental law, or the fourth, or fifth? (Does 
a wistful period of alleged collaborative trusting partnerships between government 
and industry-perhaps ended by Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, and WorldCom-
count as a generation of environmental law?) 
HeinOnline -- 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 428 2001-2002
428 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19 
our own environmental law work,1O although most of us do not 
teach our students how to scope or cope with politics. 
II. Practical Politics: A Little Fish Goes to Washington 
TVA v. Hill was in effect the final act in a long running his-
tory of conflict between an adamant federal public works agency 
that wanted to build one more dam and a remarkably persistent 
evolving coalition of citizens who fought bitterly to save the river 
and its valley.ll 
Ironically, framing the story is the fact that it is now clear the 
citizens were overwhelmingly correct about the merits of the con-
flict from the very beginning, while the agency was terribly wrong. 
This is not just the sour-grapes assertion of an erstwhile advocate. 
On the objective record at the end, the TVA's Tellico Dam project 
was a stark public policy mistake, measured in straight economic 
10. In a recent series of discussions with colleagues in Oregon I focused on the 
fact that virtually all public interest litigation must operate simultaneously on two 
tracks-on the strictly legal process involved in courts and agencies, and on the con-
current track of public opinion and legislative politics that lies beyond the courts. It is 
the latter track, where the Press is so important, that ultimately determines final 
outcomes on the ground (or in the air, water, and living systems) in so many of our 
environmental law cases. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Law and the Fourth Es-
tate: Endangered Nature, the Press, and the Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 
ENVTL. L. 1 (2002). This essay adds to that a recognition of practical politics within 
the legal process itself, particularly in dealing with federal agencies and the machin-
ery of congressional politics. And behind that lies grander political terrain .... 
11. A thumbnail chronology: 
1959 Red Wagner, Chair of TVA, tells his agency to develop an economic 
development rationale to build a 69th TVA dam, on the last 33 miles 
ofthe Little Tennessee River; planners' brainstorming leads to Tim-
1968 
1971-72 
1973 
1974 
berlake Model City plan to be built on shores of a new reservoir. 
Tellico Project funding begins, with a $65 million budget; Dam itself 
is built: a $4 million concrete structure astride the south channel of 
the Little Tennessee River; land acquisition. 
TVA declines to do an EIS; but a NEPA injunction forces halt. 
NEPA injunction dissolved, but snail darter is discovered. 
Hank Hill needs a term paper topic; dam opponents line up behind 
the darter; TVA re-starts construction and accelerates land clear-
ance. 
1975 Listing the darter as an official endangered species & listing of criti-
cal habitat. 
1976 Trial; citizen attempts to get Interior to enforce Act. 
1977 Sixth Circuit rules for darter; issues injunction. 
1978 Supreme Court hears case and affirms injunction, 6-3. 
1979 January, God Squad unanimously upholds injunction on economic 
grounds; but September, an appropriations rider overrides the 
injunction; Jimmy Carter woefully signs the bill. 
1980 River is gone; darter's natural population is terminated, although 
transplants survive. 
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terms as well as the less tangible rubrics of social, ecological and 
aesthetic concerns. 12 It destroyed major public economic values 
that greatly exceeded the project's actual economic benefits, and 
the benefits produced were far less than would have been pro-
duced by non-dam development alternatives repeatedly proposed 
by the citizen environmentalists, alternatives consistent with con-
serving the little fish.13 
Scope out protagonist agencies: they are human too. Twenty-five 
years after its founding, TVA, the New Deal's brightest rose, had 
lost momentum and suffered low morale. Founded in the late 
1930s, TVA's original missions were to make fertilizer and electri-
cal power. Understandably, TVA chose to focus on power, and in 
12. The easiest way to establish the actual merits of the Tellico Project is to re-
view the unanimous decision of the unique Cabinet-level review forum created espe-
cially to analyze the competing merits of the Tellico Dam after our Supreme Court 
victory. At that point, in December 1978 when the project was ninety-five percent 
complete, an intensive staff economic analysis, basically ignoring all the environmen-
tal, historical, and cultural values that weighed against the dam, led the Cabinet 
members and other appointees on the first Endangered Species Committee or "God 
Squad" as it was called, to decide unanimously that TVA's project had never made 
sense. As Charles Schultze, the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Ad-
visors and a member of the Committee declared, "The interesting phenomenon is that 
here is a project that is 95% complete, and if one takes just the cost of finishing it 
against the [total] benefits, and does it properly, it doesn't pay! Which says something 
about the original design!" Endangered Species Committee, Tellico Dam and Reservoir 
Project 25-26 (Jan. 23, 1979) (unpublished transcript of public hearing) (emphasis 
added) (copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Review). See also text at footnote 
56 infra. 
13. The citizens' proposed alternative development plan for the valley included 
tourist routes to the National Park, return of agricultural land to dispossessed farm-
ers, industrial sites in two industrial parks (of greater capacity than TVA's plan be-
cause low-lying lands would not be flooded), and residential and commercial 
development. With a major north-south interstate, 1-75, and a major east-west inter-
state, 1-40, within six miles of the valley, a significant number of the National Park's 
annual ten million visitors could access the Park through the valley's historic sites. If 
this entry region was designed and developed to coordinate with the Park, as it could 
because TVA already owned enough land, the valley could continue to be a prime agri-
cultural community, interspersed with tourist facilities for camping, horseback rid-
ing, float trips and exploring historical features like the forts, Indian towns, and 
Paleolithic archaeological sites (as even Ohio has done with its archaeological sites, 
with so much less to build on). The alternative development options were prepared by 
the citizens in cooperation with the University of Tennessee School of Architecture, 
but never were mentioned by TVA nor covered by the local press. 
Since the completion of the dam and the flooding ofthe reservoir, the Tellico Pro-
ject has become primarily a second-home development project for wealthy retirees, on 
land transferred on advantageous terms to a development corporation owned in part 
by Walmart's Sam Walton. The industrial park has attracted a number of industries, 
but none for which this reservoir was necessary. The farmers were unable to repur-
chase their condemned lands and now can go onto their old properties only in the 
capacity of servants or employees. 
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its first years rapidly became a world-famous dam-building 
agency. But by 1948 TVA had built three dozen dams, using up 
virtually all the major river sites that would generate substantial 
power for the system.14 But it is hard for agencies as well as indi-
viduals to give up noble self-images. In bureaucracies, moreover, 
it turns out that once you get going, "a rolling stone gathers mo-
mentum." So the agency kept on building dams, smaller and 
smaller, most of them based on shaky benefit-cost justifications. 
By 1962 the agency had more than 65 dams, with 2500 linear 
miles of river turned into a chain of sluggish impoundments de-
scending to the Mississippi. Tennessee now contains more shore-
line than all the Great Lakes combined. 15 
TVA wanted to keep alive the self-image and public sense of 
its bright progressive mission instead of settling into an identity 
as just another corpulent utility company. And what better cameo 
than the classic mental image of a dam?-bold men placing big 
chunks of concrete to block and conquer the forces of nature, back-
ing up a river into swollen captivity under human control, and re-
leasing it according to engineering whim in frothy spillways, their 
spray throwing rainbows to the sky. 
Mter building more than five dozen dams, however, TVA had 
run out of places where another traditional dam could be justified. 
The agency had shifted ninety percent of its energy production to 
coal and nukes and was indeed becoming just another utility. But 
in a decisive turnaround meeting held at his Watts Bar Dam con-
ference center in 1959, Aubrey "Red" Wagner, the agency's gen-
eral manager and later chairman, resurrected the agency's spirits 
by launching a new initiative that might let them build more 
dams. Starting with a dam to impound the last thirty-three miles 
of flowing river left in the Little Tennessee River, the Tellico Dam, 
TVA would define a new mission and justify its continued exis-
tence by commencing a new series of "regional economic demon-
14. The agency began to shift its mode of power production so that by the 1970s, 
ninety percent of TVA's power was being generated by nuclear and coal-burning 
steam plants. 
15. The Great Lakes contain 7870 miles of shoreline. 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-
NICA. The Great Lakes 774 (1973 ed.), cited in Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Reflected in a 
River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747 
(1973). The total shoreline of TVA reservoirs within Tennessee is roughly 10,000 in 
summertime. Telephone interview with TVA Public Information Office (Sept. 3, 
1982). 
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stration" projects. 16 The Tellico Project became an obsession for 
Chairman Wagner, and by extension for the entire agency he dom-
inated. Wagner engineered an intensive internal mobilization of 
TVA's forces, driving the Tellico Dam to completion despite its lack 
of normal water project purposes and despite its violations of envi-
ronmentallaw. 
To understand the merits of the $160 million Tellico Dam pro-
ject you have to start with the bemusing fact that most of that 
sum was for land purchase and development. The project's pri-
mary avowed purpose besides recreation was to create a base for a 
model industrial city to be called "Timberlake New Town" that the 
agency said would require a reservoir. At a cost of $850 million-
most of it not included in the Tellico Dam accounting, including at 
least $145 million in additional "infrastructure grant" subsidies 
that Congress would be asked to provide at some later date-TVA 
and its partner, the Boeing Corporation, said their hypothetical 
Timberlake City would bring 50,000 people and 26,000 new jobs to 
the area.17 The "shoreland development" benefits of this plan, 
along with even greater hypothesized recreational benefits, al-
16. The internal agency story is told in a book written from TVA archives, WIL-
LIAM BRUCE WHEELER & MICHAEL J. McDONALD, TVA ANn THE TELLICO DAM, 1936-
1979: A BUREAUCRATIC CRISIS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1986), and a case study, 
STEPHEN J. RECHICHAR & MICHAEL R. FITZGERALD, THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADMINIS· 
TRATIVE DECISION: TVA's ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MISSION AND INTRAGOVERNMENT 
REGULATION (1983). These two books are excellent sources of background data on the 
history and merits of the controversy and TVA's adamancy in pushing the dam in the 
face of the law and critical analysis on the merits. 
The TVA can self-authorize projects if they fit its charter, and Wagner was seizing 
upon Section 22 of the TVA Act which authorizes "the proper use, conservation, and 
development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and of 
such adjoining territory as may be related to or materially affected by the develop-
ment consequent to this chapter .... " TVA Act § 22, 16 U.S.C. § 831u (1994) (original 
version at ch. 32, § 22, 48 Stat. 69 (1933)). 
17. TVA planners hypothesized the Timberlake model city following the design of 
a utopian city conceived by Athelstan Spilhaus in the 1940s that likewise was never 
built. See TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority Environmental Statement: Timberlake 
New Community 1-1-32 (Jan. 9, 1976). TVA asserted, with no empirical data, that its 
model city would need a reservoir, hypothesizing that it would best develop if it had a 
barge channel in addition to the already-existing existing railroad and interstate 
highway facilities. Swatara, Minnesota, also considered building a Spilhaus utopia in 
the form of a 20,000-acre domed city, which, after approximately $1.5 million in pri-
vate and public money spent on planning throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, was 
finally defeated in the 1973 Minnesota legislature due to stiff opposition and budget-
ary constraints. Once a Dead and Buried Idea, a Futuristic Domed City Shows Signs 
of Life, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1987, at 3C. TVA planners named the hypothetical city 
"Timberlake" after Lt. Henry Timberlake of George Ill's colonial army who visited the 
valley and produced the first map of the area in 1762. 
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lowed TVA to claim a 1.70/1.00 benefit-cost ratio (later modified 
downward).18 Because Tellico was such a marginal site, the dam 
would have no generators, and traditional water project benefits 
were minimal-small potential increments in barge navigation, 
water supply, power enhancement,19 and flood control. TVA con-
demned more than twice as much land to give to Boeing and sell to 
developers than to impound with a reservoir-more than 38,000 
acres taken from more than 340 farm families, with only 12,000 
acres to be flooded. 20 Only about twenty-nine percent of the 
project lands would be covered by the reservoir. Despite the inevi-
table image of the controversy, the Tellico project was fundamen-
tally not a hydroelectric dam project. The dam was just the 
dubious central feature of a federal recreation and land-develop-
ment project.21 
18. Under Senate Document No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), every federal 
agency, when spending tax payer dollars, had to have a theoretically profitable bene-
fit-cost ratio-for every taxpayer dollar spent, the proposed project has to be able to 
claim to earn at least $1.01 over 100 years. Beyond hyperbolic benefit projections, 
agency planners were helped in projecting their positive ratios by the fact that they 
could treat the cost of taxpayer dollars as interest-free, or nearly so. 
The official Benefit-Cost ration as of the 1972 environmental impact statement: 
DIRECT ANNUAL BENEFITS: 
Flood control 
Navigation 
Power 
Recreation 
Fish & wildlife 
Water supply 
Shoreline development 
Redevelopment 
Total Direct Annual Benefits: 
DIRECT ANNUAL COSTS: 
Interest and amortization 
Operation & maintenance 
Total Annual Costs: 
Benefit-Cost Ratio (later downgraded): 
From TVA, TELLICO DAM PROJECT EIS 1-1-49 (1972). 
$505,000 
400,000 
400,000 
1,440,000 
220,000 
70,000 
714,000 
15,000 
$3,760,000 
$2,045,000 
205,000 
$2,250,000 
1.7: 1. 
19. Tellico had no generators but could redirect flows through a canal to an adja-
cent dam, generating circa twenty-four megawatts of power. To put this in perspec-
tive, TVA's existing system contained more than 22,000 megawatts capacity, and an 
economist figured that the valley lands, if their annual biomass production was 
merely burned in a steam plant, would produce more power than a dam, netting 
thirty-five megawatts. 
20. Under the agency's special juryless condemnation procedures the farmlands 
could be taken for an average of less than $400 an acre. Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Re-
flected in a River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN L. 
REV. 747, 759 n.37 (1973). 
21. It was never seriously questioned within TVA why an economic development 
project required a dam. Institutionally it was well understood that the opportunity to 
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The resources that the dam project would eliminate, on the 
other hand, were extraordinary. The broad valley of the Little 
Tennessee River where it flows out of the Great Smoky Mountains 
had been an especially rich natural place for millennia. Archaeo~ 
logical digs along the river revealed the oldest continuous human 
habitation sites in all of North America, more than 10,000 years of 
human history. The River's waters ran cool, highly oxygenated, 
fertile, and filled with fish. The valley lands were rich beyond be~ 
lief, high-grade topsoil to a depth of twenty feet or more. The 
Cherokees' central towns, their most sacred places, and Chota, 
their holy city of refuge, were located here on the riverbank. The 
first Anglo colonists entered the valley in the 18th century, build-
ing a log fort, Fort Loudon, as their southwestern-most redoubt 
protecting them and their Cherokee allies against the French and 
other Indian tribes. After Andrew Jackson drove the Cherokees 
out of the valley, white settlers moved in to take over the vacated 
Cherokee lands. Many of those early families and old Fort Loudon 
were still there in the valley 200 years later when TVA decided to 
build Tellico Dam.22 The agricultural land along the river was 
home to more than 350 family farms, with 15,500 acres of the rich-
build another dam was the central motivation for the project and an essential part of 
the reinvigoration of internal agency morale. WHEELER & McDONALD, supra note 16, 
at 3-33. TVA's most constantly voiced justification for insisting on a dam and reser-
voir was the so-called "Foster Hypothesis." In conversations with lower-level TVA 
staffers in the 1970s the author was repeatedly told of the internal importance of the 
"Foster Hypothesis," which underpinned the rosy economic projections for Timberlake 
by asserting that industry would be drawn to a site so closely accessible to three dif-
ferent modes of transportation-in this case, two interstate highways, a railroad line, 
and a barge channel. They indicated that this functional hypothesis was not based on 
empirical data but on Foster's executive intuition. Minnard "Mike" Foster, TVA's di-
rector of navigation and regional development planning, regularly repeated his intui-
tive assertion, incorporated into the agency's official benefit-cost calculations, that 
corporate investment would be drawn to Timberlake New Town by the particular 
transportation combination, at the Tellico Project's midpoint, of a railroad line, inter-
state highway access, and a barge terminus. See TELLICO DAM AND RESERVOIR, STAFF 
REPORT TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE (Jan. 19, 1979). The latter required 
a Tellico reservoir and canal. As it happened, the barge terminal lies choked in 
weeds, and appears today, after twenty years, to have been used only once, by a TVA 
dredging barge. 
22. As early as 1894, Cyrus Thomas of the Bureau of Ethnology, a branch of the 
Smithsonian Institution, observed, "The valley of the Little Tennessee River from 
where it leaves the Smoky [M]ountains which form the boundary between North Car-
olina and Tennessee, to where it joins the Tennessee River in Loudon County, is un-
doubtedly the most interesting archeological section in the entire Appalachian 
district." Endangered Species-Part 2: Hearing on H.R. 10833 Before the Subcommit-
tee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Commit-
tee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 668 (1978) (exhibit taken 
from National Register of Historic Places). 
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est earth in the nation, USDA Class One and Two soils, virtually 
all of which would be eliminated by the reservoir. 
Environmental analysis should seek to make economic sense-ben-
efits, costs, and alternatives. The project's environmental oppo-
nents determined early that they would have to do more than 
merely oppose the dam and reservoir. Instead, as so often occurs 
in environmental cases, to have a realistic chance of prevailing in 
the long run they had to base their position on a comprehensive 
conceptual benefit-cost-alternatives accounting. On one hand the 
Tellico citizens group reviewed the purported benefits of the reser-
voir-recreation, an uncertain model city's industrial develop-
ment on condemned lands, and minor claimed benefits in water 
supply, flood control, and hydroelectric capacity-and found them 
on the objective record to be quite insubstantial. Viewed in busi-
nesslike terms, the dam project was an economic basket case. 
They then looked at the purported costs of the project, arguing 
that the true costs extended beyond the Authority's costs for ce-
ment, fill dirt, land condemnation, and roads and bridges. A real-
istic accounting of the true social costs would have to include the 
loss of all the special qualities of the river valley that had made it 
a treasure over the centuries. The river was a major recreational 
resource on its own terms, even before it had been rendered a vir-
tually unique resource by the impoundment of 2500 linear miles of 
river in the surrounding region. The agricultural soils of the val-
ley were of great economic value, the historic resources held great 
public value in their own right and could be capitalized monetarily 
in a tourist-based development if the valley's central portion was 
not flooded, and a major parcel of upriver project lands had partic-
ular potential for use as an access and overflow management area 
for the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. The citizens' ben-
efit-cost accounting thus included extensive consideration of de-
velopment alternatives. 
With increasing sophistication over the years the citizens ar-
gued for a comprehensive river-based development project, al-
lowing displaced families to go back onto most of the rich 
agricultural lands of the valley, developing a tourist highway 
through the valley to the Park, developing recreation to promote 
canoe float trips and other water-based sports, improving access 
to the superb trout fishing resource, and providing for two indus-
trial parks along the river at locations where they would not dis-
turb the other qualities of the valley. And over the years the 
citizens' analysis of the project consistently proved more accurate 
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than the TVA's projections in every expert review that took place 
during the course of the controversy. 
Dogging the citizens' steps from the start, however, was the 
fundamental fact that we were missing the point. With the Tellico 
Dam, as with many environmentally destructive projects and pro-
grams, environmental activists have felt obliged to address the 
purported public purposes of the project and attempt to refute 
them, presenting alternatives that would better achieve the 
agency's purported economic objectives. But the true objectives 
motivating the project internally and within the water project es-
tablishment in Washington were not its alleged public purposes, 
but rather internal institutional drives to keep agency morale and 
momentum rolling, to win federal appropriations, and to build lo-
cal and national political capita1.23 
Early in the process we tried to persuade contacts within TVA 
to get the agency to enter into mediation with us on Tellico. At the 
time Chief Justice Burger was prodding attorneys to seek negoti-
ated win-win conflict resolutions outside the crowded courts. But 
our main contact inside TVA told me, "It will never happen. Red 
Wagner and his boys will never go into a mediation where all the 
facts and alternatives are laid out on the table. If they did, the 
rational conclusion would be all too obvious-some kind of devel-
opment plan without a dam. But my bosses think they'll beat you 
if they can play their own game." Why did the leadership react so 
strongly against considering our alternative vision for the valley? 
"Look, Zyg, it's male menopause. These guys came down here as 
young reformers, a lot of them from Cambridge. They came here 
to lift a primitive region out of its backwardness. Now thirty 
years later when some of the locals start to have their own ideas 
about how the region should be developed, these guys get hot 
flashes. The children are bucking their betters. The leadership 
can't abide the thought that you might win." It was clear, he said, 
once TVA had decided what was best for the valley and for the 
agency itself, it would brook no opposition. 
Our attempts to refute the project on its claimed rationales 
were indeed missing the point. Underlying internal institutional 
political reasons were carrying the project onward without regard 
to its actual public economics or logic. Only by forcing trans-
parency, bringing the debate out into a publicly visible analytical 
23. See generally WILLIAM AsHWORTH, UNDER THE INFLUENCE: CONGRESS, LOB-
BIES, AND THE AMERICAN PORK BARREL SYSTEM (1981). 
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forum where civic public merits can predominate, could we hope to 
sidestep the power of the insider establishment that did not care 
about those merits. 
Citizen statutory enforcement can create a governmental forum 
where none exists. The problem the citizens faced is that in our 
legal system there is no established forum in which public interest 
advocate outsiders can reliably trigger official analytical scrutiny, 
no way to obtain an accounting, even if on its merits a project is 
demonstrably irrational and destructive. There is no entity 
within the administrative and legislative processes that reliably 
provides a roving commission seeking out ongoing agency or eco-
nomic initiatives that need review.24 Courts for their part like-
wise do not willingly take on the role of project and program 
scrutiny. 
But it may be different where citizens can find and prove a 
substantive statutory violation in court, forcing the other 
branches of government to take account of the larger questions. 
Without an endangered fish, the American system of governance 
provided no mechanism for addressing and rectifying the ongoing 
mistakes of the Tellico Dam. With a fish, the dam ultimately got 
the highest-level economic review in the history of the American 
pork barrel system. 
In October 1974, second-year law student Hank Hill (yes, that 
Hill) walked into his environmental law professor's office and told 
how his grad student buddies' ichthyology professor had just 
found a small, hitherto-unknown perch, an endangered species, on 
a large set of shoals at Coytee Springs smack in the middle of the 
Tellico project, a fish that apparently existed only here because it 
had been extirpated in every other big river habitat in the South-
east by dams. "Do you think that is enough of a topic for a ten-
page term paper?" I said I thought it would be. 
At a hastily called meeting at Old Fort Loudon the next Sat-
urday night, a contingent of us from the University of Tennessee 
College of Law asked the farmers and other local citizens who had 
lost an earlier National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) fight25 
whether they wanted to fight the dam once more. Should the bat-
24. Senator Proxmire used to issue annual Golden Fleece Awards to projects and 
programs he identified as wasteful, but that maverick process was scarcely a "forum" 
for review, and the good Senator and his awards are no longer with us. 
25. Envtl. Def. Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), affd, 492 F.2d 
466 (6th Cir. 1974). 
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tered little coalition pull together and try once more, using the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA)? 
The facts and the law seemed clear, we said. If you parsed 
Section 7 of the ESA of 1973 carefully, there were at least two 
causes of action hidden within its verbal foliage. Eliding the itali-
cized words that follow, once we got the species and its critical 
habitat listed, we could assert two separate violations: 
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
The Secretary [of Interior] shall review other programs adminis-
tered by him and utilize such programs in furtherance of the 
purposes of this chapter. All other federal departments and 
agencies shall in consultation with and with the assistance of 
the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the pur-
poses of this chapter while carrying out programs for the conser-
vation of endangered species and threatened species listed 
pursuant to section 1533 of this title, and by taking such actions 
necessary to insure that any actions authorized, funded, or car-
ried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or 
modification of habitat of any species which is determined by 
the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with the af-
fected States, to be critical.26 
The dam would eliminate the entire known population of 
darters, and destroy their critical habitat. The statute was vio-
lated and so an injunction should issue. Asa McCall, old and griz-
zled, who for months had been holding off the TVA condemnation 
marshals with his dog and his shotgun and the presence of a news 
photographer, looked around the room and said, "I've never before 
heard of this little fish, but if it can save our farms, I say let's give 
it a try." He passed his hat around the room and the $29 collected 
in it that night was the seed money for the snail darter campaign. 
Before commencing the legal process, however, we called Joe 
Sax asking his advice. Citizen enforcement actions can be criti-
cally useful civic initiatives, but can also be crude unguided mis-
siles that backfire, blow up, hit the wrong targets, or for a host of 
other reasons should never have been launched in the first place. 
Should we launch a case that would obviously be so open to ridi-
cule, especially at first impression, potentially undercutting the 
ESA itself and by extension giving anti-regulationists a political 
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (as it stood in 1973) (emphasis added). 
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tool against all environmental laws? When he heard about the 
economics and common sense of the case, however, Sax said, 
"Sounds reasonable to me. I'd say try it." So, from the beginning, 
the campaign was Saxist: The citizen litigation aimed to get a 
statutory enforcement injunction, which would shift the matter to 
Congress to resolve the impasse-a "remand to the legislature"27 
where the facts of the case could finally be seen and analyzed in a 
public forum and the case resolved upon the real public merits. 
Let us observe the politics within the case as it progressed, 
viewing politics here in the context of people, structures, and 
tendencies. 
Localism. Note that it was important from the beginning that the 
citizen group enforcing the ESA against the Tellico Dam was 
deeply based within the locality. Localism is a dominant consider-
ation in most environmental controversies. It just would not have 
worked to have this case launched and carried on by a handful of 
people based in the university wearing Earth Shoes and turtle-
neck sweaters. It was practically and politically essential that the 
coalition included farmers who were defending their homes and 
land, Cherokee Indians who had an ancestral tie to the place, and 
a variety of people who were well known in the locality as person-
ally invested and committed to the valley and the river. Without 
them the venture could have been dismissed as doubly superfi-
cial-an insignificant fish represented by elitists with no signifi-
cant linkage to the place or the controversy-and thus politically 
illegitimate. 
The legal chronology of the case moved through three stages: 
The official listing of the species, statutory enforcement in court, 
and the defense of the statutory injunction and the Act against 
political backlash. Without the official listing of the species and 
its critical habitat nothing else in the legal process would follow. 
Once the species was listed, the question was whether the statute 
would be enforced against the Tellico Dam, and by whom? And 
after the injunction was issued, how would it be defended in the 
political process against a powerful and foreseeable backlash? 
27. Ultimately Professor Sax's concept of "remand to the legislature" was cited in 
our Supreme Court brief and may well have been the argument that swung Chief 
Justice Burger's vote. "[T]he role of courts is not to make public policy, but to help 
assure that public policy is made by the appropriate entity .... " Brieffor Respondent 
at 44 n.38, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701) (quoting JOSEPH L. SAX,· 
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN ACTION 151 (1970)). 
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Getting the Fish Officially Listed 
Soon after the meeting in the old fort, our little group and 
biologists from the university put together a package of data dem-
onstrating that this previously unidentified fish was a separate 
species, clearly threatened by the dam. The packet was sent off to 
the Office of Endangered Species, in the Department of Interior's 
Fish and Wildlife Service, and we asked for an emergency listing. 
Hesitancy within the regulatory bureaucracy, and 5 U.S.C. section 
553 (e), the rule-petitioning provision of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. Within two days we received word through an inform-
ant in the Department of the Interior that the package of 
information looked good, solid, biologically accurate. So would the 
Department proceed on an expedited basis to list the fish? The 
answer was a sympathetic but emphatic no. "We never have done 
one of these emergency listings, and it's quite clear that this case 
is going to be controversial, so no one here is going to stick their 
neck out to start this process anytime soon." 
The construction agency, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
however, would have no such hesitation about acting. Every week 
and month that the listing was delayed would mean just so many 
more trees and farms eliminated from the valley. "Can we peti-
tion you ourselves to put the listing process in motion?" "I don't 
see why not. It's never been done, but citizens have the right to 
petition the government, I guess." 
Later that week, January 25, 1975, we designed and put to-
gether a formal petition to force the agency to list, using 5 U.s.C. 
§ 553(e), a useful and under-used leveraging tool that allows citi-
zen petitioners to frame a proposed rule in their own chosen terms 
and perhaps to leverage an agency out of its bureaucratic iner-
tia.28 How do you design a petition to list a species? There was no 
form. We invented a five-point document. The first allegation as-
serted that "1. The fish currently known as the snail darter ex-
ists . ... " which seemed to be a logical way to start. The attached 
exhibit showed a photograph of the fish and three pages of scien-
tific description recounting in excruciating detail what this darter 
looked like and how it was different from all other members of the 
darter family. The second section asserted that the fish, as far as 
28. Once it receives a § 553(e) petition, an agency must act on it within a reasona-
ble amount of time, and if it rejects the petition it must, under § 555(e), explain the 
rational basis for doing so, which then provides an opportunity for the citizens to chal-
lenge the denial under the arbitrary and capricious judicial review test of § 706. 
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was known, existed only within the Little Tennessee River Valley 
within the Tellico Project area. The third section asserted that 
the darter's existing habitat appeared to be critical to the continu-
ing existence of the species. The fourth section showed that the 
Tellico Project would destroy the snail darter. The final point was 
that "TVA knows about the fish, its threatened status, and the 
Act, but continues with its timber clearing, excavating, and con-
struction," with a letter from TVA's chief executive saying that 
they would not halt their ongoing activities. This amateurish pe-
tition turned out to be a sufficient scientific and logical basis to 
launch the rule making process on its way toward listing the spe-
cies and its critical habitat. 
"Multi-centric" government: citizen enforcement: governmental ac-
tors do not just automatically get under way when the facts and 
statutes require them to. Note already a basic political lesson. The 
administrative process often inclines toward inertia. To make 
statutory enforcement happen in settings that are politically-
charged or burdensome, citizens often have to invest the time and 
effort to make it happen. The availability of citizen enforcement 
in American public law since the 1960s29 has been a major factor 
in shifting government toward a multi-centric pluralism, away 
from the traditional bipolar model of governance (in which on one 
hand the marketplace provides the society's pervasive, sustaining 
internal drive, and government on the other hand protects citizens 
and society from the marketplace's excesses). This is not to say 
that all citizen initiatives are logical or wise, because citizen en-
29. Beginning in the 1960s a host of environmental statutes replicated the citizen 
enforcement provisions of the civil rights acts, and the litigation that followed built 
environmental law. See Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 19(d), 20(c)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2618(d), § 2619; Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11(g)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)(4); 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(d); 
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act § 117(c), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1427(c); Clean 
Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 505), 33 
U.s.C.A. § 1365(d); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1415(g)(4); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1515(d); Safe Drinking Water 
Act § 1449(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8(d); Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12(d), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 4911(d); Energy Sources Development Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(e)(2); Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6305(d); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6972(e); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7604, 7607(D; Powerplant and Indus-
trial Fuel Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8435(d); Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Act, 42 
U.s.C.A. § 9124(d); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1349(a)(5). Most 
of these also provide for attorney and expert witness fee awards to the extent plain-
tiffs prevail. ZYGMUNT PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw & POLICY: NATURE, LAw 
& SOCIETY 403 n.31 (2d ed., West 1998) [hereinafter PLATER, ET AL., NATURE, LAw & 
SOCIETYJ. 
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forcement can be problematic. But the snail darter case demon-
strates a setting where a situation that merited statutory 
enforcement required citizen efforts because the appropriate agen-
cies were unable to act. Our informant within the Fish and Wild-
life Service's Office of Endangered Species recounted the agency's 
great internal consternation. Our listing petition looked impreg-
nable, and that meant trouble. "My boss says we are going to 
move slow on this. He says you're the enemy, you're going to 
wreck the Act." Representatives of Senate Minority Leader How-
ard Baker of Tennessee and John Stennis, senior senator from 
Mississippi, were applying heavy pressure to halt the listing in its 
tracks. . 
The extraordinary usefulness of inside informants, and a note on 
killifish. This communication from inside the Office of Endan-
gered Species emphasizes how important it is to have contacts 
within the system who can provide straight and relevant informa-
tion without going through formal channels. Such contacts are de-
veloped through effort or luck. In this case the staffer was a 
biologist who had personal connections to the University of Ten-
nessee through a network of ichthyology and herpetology scien-
tists. It was important that the inside informant and the citizens 
on the outside knew and could trust one another, because the ac-
tion of an individual government employee in such a highly-
charged political setting can create career-ending indiscretions if 
the contact is publicized.30 And make no mistake, the snail darter 
case was quickly identified as politically charged. People in the 
Department of Interior bureaucracy were not eager to be identi-
fied as taking the initiative to list and protect endangered species. 
As one participant explained, "most agency employees are killi-
fish." Like those large schools of little fish you see swimming by 
the thousands, instantly shifting together, left and right, as they 
move through the water, the fundamental strategy of survival is 
to blend in with the mass, not to stand out. What happens to the 
fish that is larger, or faster, or different from the rest? That fish 
stands out and is targeted by the ever-present predators. Within 
30. By the time the snail darter controversy had passed through four more years 
of legal process, three other special contacts had played indispensable roles in shut-
tling information back and forth between Washington and Tennessee, often involving 
surreptitious communications, "midnight phone calls," and in each case we took elabo-
rate precautions to remain discreet, to the extent of using four different cover names 
so that sign-in sheets at the entrances to federal agencies and phone logs would not 
reveal that these staffers were talking with the controversial Tennessee citizen 
outsiders. 
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the civil service it is often safer not to be known as a person who is 
particularly energetic in enforcing the national policies embodied 
within a controversial statute. 
The Power of Pork. What did it mean that Senator Stennis was 
leaning on the biologists of Interior's Office of Endangered Spe-
cies? It marked the appearance of a major political force that sub-
sequently launched a successful long-term guerilla war against 
our implementation of the Endangered Species Act. Stennis was 
Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and he repre-
sented the power of the pork barrel. The pork barrel is an extraor-
dinarily powerful and complex structure of alliances throughout 
Congress and beyond, driven by annual expenditures of billions of 
taxpayer dollars ladled up by appropriations committees in both 
chambers and poured out into projects and programs in congres-
sional districts across the United States. Water projects consti-
tute one of the oldest and most powerful pork barrels, in which 
TVA is a junior partner. Senator Baker had been able to pull in 
Senator Stennis not because the Tellico Dam in and of itself was a 
major federal project, but because our challenge to Tellico Dam 
potentially posed a threat to water projects all over the country. 
"The real problem for Stennis is not Tellico, but Tenn-Tom," 
said our informant, whom we will call Chuck Cook. The Tennes-
see-Tombigbee Waterway just then getting underway was a quin-
tessential pork barrel project with a budget of four billion dollars, 
a totally unprecedented pork budget for that time. The Corps of 
Engineers proposed literally to move mountains to build a barge 
channel running from the Tennessee River through the mountains 
of Northern Alabama down to Mobile on the Gulf, creating in ef-
fect a second Mississippi River. What threat did the ESA pose? 
Chuck told us that soon after the snail darter story broke his office 
had been asked for information on endangered species in this 
Northern Alabama corridor, and had identified four fish and mol-
lusk species that were threatened by the Tenn-Tom. Tenn-Tom, 
like most of the dozens of authorized pork barrel water projects, 
could not withstand the transparency of having its economics 
scrutinized in a public forum. If the Act's mandatory provisions 
could force judicial and political scrutiny of these water projects, 
then our little fish from Tennessee could embarrass a sprawling 
mass of federal largesse programs starting with Tenn-Tom. The 
darter was politically endangered not only by TVA, the agency 
that wanted to eliminate its Little Tennessee River habitat, but 
also by the hornets' nests it would stir up throughout many other 
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regions of the country. Facing this prospect, the pork barrel be-
came a powerful and implacable foe operating within the central 
precincts of the political process. 
This episode also underscored the political difference between 
appropriations committees and the regular committees of Con-
gress. The appropriations committees wielded the power of pork. 
The subject matter committees-which pass and amend all the 
substantive regulatory laws on natural resources, agriculture, pol-
lution, public health, historic preservation, as well as budget, 
banking, government operations, courts and the judiciary, labor, 
securities, and all the rest-are more erratic. In the daily politics 
of Washington it seemed to us that the appropriations committees 
were far more feared, a conclusion underscored by the official 
rules that prevent appropriations committee members from sit-
ting on any other committee, and forbid making substantive law 
changes on money bills. Appropriations committees, unlike the 
regular committees, meet each and every year, supervising every 
agency and allocating funds through an array of subcommittees 
that almost exactly replicate the regular committees. Appropria-
tions committees can virtually nullify a statute by eliminating its 
financing. The allocative ability to pour or block a flow of federal 
dollars into every congressional district in the nation gives appro-
priations committee members almost peremptory power. Mem-
bers of the regular committees only revisited the statutes within 
their jurisdiction when opportune moments to do so presented 
themselves. The regular committees, however, especially their 
committee and subcommittee chairmen, sometimes care a lot 
about protecting their political turf. If you can show them that the 
pork committees are interfering with something they think is in 
their area of jurisdiction, you sometimes can get them jealous 
enough to fight about it. 
The "sunk cost" strategy of project promoters facing statutory en-
forcement. The Department of Interior's reluctance to act con-
trasted with TVA's eagerness to build. In the months after the 
darter petition was filed TVA accelerated its efforts to condemn 
homes, build levees and reservoir bridges, bulldoze farm buildings 
and scalp trees from the project area. The agency chose to begin 
its "land treatment"-tree cutting and scraping-at Coytee 
Springs, the historic site on the riverbank marking the shoal that 
was the snail darter's prime natural habitat. The bulldozing be-
gan surreptitiously before dawn. By sunrise all the trees had been 
cut at Coytee Springs and a cascade of mud poured out into the 
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river, covering for a time the endangered species' spawning and 
feeding habitat. Over the next months TVA crews worked two and 
then three shifts a day, under portable floodlights through the 
night, so as to spend as much money as possible and eliminate as 
much of the valley's homes, barns, and vegetation as quickly as 
possible. 
What was going on here? It was the "sunk cost" strategy.31 
Project promoters in the public and private sectors often under-
standably wish to get as much physically accomplished and as 
much money invested in a venture before their project is con-
fronted in a legal forum. The first law of bureaucracy, public or 
private, is that "a rolling stone gathers momentum." The object is 
to get the project to a point where the defenders are demoralized 
and the promoter can argue "it's too late to turn back now," either 
because the issue is legally moot, or at the very least that a bal-
ance of equities will at that point tilt in favor of continuing the 
process: "Regretfully, too much has been done; too much money 
spent; too little of value remains to permit consideration of alter-
natives at this late date." The sunk cost phenomenon recurs often 
in environmental law. In Nashville, 150 miles to the west, the 
Overton Park case had provided a vivid example where the federal 
and state departments of transportation consciously knocked 
down houses and built the interstate highway up to the very edge 
of the legally-protected park, so as to be able to say then that it 
regrettably was no longer feasible and prudent to go anywhere but 
straight through the park.32 Here in the Tellico Dam case, as the 
citizens attempted to navigate the legal process of protecting the 
fish, it was continually disheartening and distressing to observe 
TVA's weekly progress of destruction in the valley, so clearly in-
tended to forestall public policy considerations of any project con-
figuration other than a dam and reservoir. Simultaneously TVA 
began to capture darters from the major breeding shoals and 
transplant them to locations elsewhere in Tennessee. 
Faced with TVA's accelerated efforts to moot the issue, where 
could we turn? The Department of the Interior's reluctance to list 
the species showed the enforcement agency's weakness. Our in-
side contact indicated that the Fish and Wildlife Service regarded 
31. See David E. Cole, Note, Judicial Discretion and the "Sunk Costs" Strategies of 
Government Agencies, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2003). 
32. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); PLATER 
ET AL., NATURE, LAw & SOCIETY, supra note 29, at 391 n.15. Part of the drama of that 
case is that it is one of just a few sunk cost cases where the ploy did not work. 
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the petition for listing as "a nightmare." The agency was being 
pushed into a situation "which could destroy the entire Endan-
gered Species Act; as far as the Fish and Wildlife Service is con-
cerned, you people in Tennessee are the enemy." This was not 
necessarily an irrational reaction on the part of the Department of 
Interior. Unlike the citizens, the Department had to function over 
time in a complex political setting where the anger of the public 
works pork barrel coalitions could be politically disastrous. And 
some of Interior's own divisions were charter members of the pub-
lic works pork barrel, including the Bureau of Reclamation and 
the Bureau of Land Management. 
The Office of the President: CEQ? We went to the Council of En vi-
ronmental Quality (CEQ) in the Office of the President. There 
was some reason to be hopeful about CEQ. We had chanced to see 
a magazine quotation from Lee Talbot, a senior staffer in both 
Nixon and Ford's CEQ commenting that "in some cases an endan-
gered species may be more important to the nation than a particu-
lar dam and reservoir project." Nixon was our most environmen-
tal President, measured by the number of statutes he signed into 
law.33 But in his last two years, a substantial anti-regulatory in-
dustrial backlash had mounted against the new array of environ-
mental statutes, and Nixon quickly backed off, trying to impound 
money allocated for enforcement of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act. Gerald Ford, his accidental successor, did not have a 
clear idea whether or not he was an environmentalist. When we 
visited with Lee Talbot at CEQ he rapidly distanced himself from 
his comment about endangered species and dams, knowing that 
this was a highly sensitive issue and that he and CEQ lacked the 
ability to pursue the matter. 
An introduction to Congress and the dirty little secret of govern-
ment. The citizens groups in Washington advised us to find pres-
sure points within Congress. Congress is not a monolith but an 
assemblage of 535 volatile and potentially potent leverage points. 
Trekking through a variety of congressional offices, we located a 
pressure point in the office of the chairman of the Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife. 
The subcommittee counsel had been a key player in the original 
33. There were thirty-four important environmental statutes passed in the three 
years after the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. PLATER, ET AL., NATURE, 
LAW & SOCIETY (2d. ed. 2001-02 Teacher's Manual Annual Update 355-57) (historical 
statutory appendix). Only Jimmy Carter's years come close, with twenty in an 
equivalent span, many of which were merely perfecting amendments. Id. at 357-58. 
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passage of the ESA. ''You have to understand," he told us. "Most 
members of Congress never read the bills they vote on, and this 
one was no exception. Only a few members and a few of us staff-
ers had any idea the Act could be used to stop destructive 
projects." Another staffer chimed, "Even if they know what these 
bills say, the dirty little secret of government, as you'll find out, is 
that just because legislatures pass a law doesn't mean they really 
intend that it be implemented. A lot of do-good laws are just sym-
bolic reassurance to the public that the legislature is on top of 
things. If you want to know what legislators really want, look at 
where they appropriate the money. 
ESA enforcement appropriations were trivial. The subcom-
mittee counsel and Rep. John Dingell for whom he had worked, 
however, clearly had wanted Section 7 of the ESA to wield its hid-
den teeth eventually. "But we hoped the first case to come up 
would involve whooping cranes or bald eagles, not something that 
sounds silly." Mter working through the common sense details of 
the case with us, however, the counsel agreed to help. The sub-
committee chairman would push Interior to list the darter by 
threatening the Department with oversight hearings on imple-
mentation of the ESA, with pointed reference to the listing process 
and the snail darter case. He also advised us to threaten a citizen 
lawsuit to force the agency to list the endangered species, a sug-
gestion we received several times over the years from within the 
agencies as well,34 a process which, if we had to do it, would be as 
difficult as it was unprecedented. 
This push and advice from the subcommittee were effective. 
The double threat of peremptory oversight hearings and a citizen 
lawsuit highlighting the non-listing of species finally prompted 
Under-Secretary Nathaniel Reed to sign a notice of proposed rule 
making in October 1975, and by the end ofthe year the darter and 
its critical habitat were officially listed. 
Enforcing the Law in Court 
When Big Government cannot do the job. . . A listing under the 
ESA, however, is not self-enforcing. TVA was continuing land 
clearance on an accelerated schedule, and given that it would not 
34. On at least two other occasions we received earnest requests from within an 
agency to "please sue us, and then we can go to our boss and tell him we have to do 
what we should already be doing in the first place." In the face of strong economic and 
political coalitions in the marketplace economy, agencies sometimes cannot or will not 
readily implement the counter-marketplace roles they were designed to play unless 
freed to do so by countervailing threats from civic forces like citizen lawsuits. 
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voluntarily reconsider its ongoing project, who now would enforce 
the Act against Tellico Dam? Not Congress, not the President, 
and, as it turned out, not Interior. Again the political setting 
ultimately required the citizens to take on the work of law 
enforcement. 
What can one federal agency do against another federal 
agency in a situation like this where one is the regulator and the 
other stands in the position of a violator? The TVA sent delegation 
after delegation of its staffers to Washington to "consult" with 
the Department of Interior, but the point of that consultation 
throughout was to back Interior off from any threat of legal action 
by arguing that the Act did not apply to ongoing projects and shift-
ing the discussion to transplantation, putting the endangered fish 
somewhere, anywhere, else. From the beginning, Chuck Cook told 
us, TVA took the position with Interior that it would talk until 
everyone is blue in the face about trying to find natural popula-
tions elsewhere or transplanting the fish somewhere else, but TVA 
would simply not discuss the possibility that its dam project would 
not be completed on schedule. 
Where was the Department of Interior? Under political pres-
sure, it was shrinking away from the mandates of the Act. Implic-
itly refuting the charge that federal agencies are constantly 
seeking to expand their powers, Interior tried to compromise the 
Act by proposing draft regulations that narrowed the range of its 
authority,35 interpreting Section 7 as applying only prospectively, 
to future federal actions, not to ongoing projects. Interior was 
clearly not willing to initiate administrative or judicial proceed-
ings against TVA, although it attempted a series of gestures in the 
direction of enforcement. Pressured by us the FWS began denying 
permits for transplantation of the fish away from the river. They 
created a paper trail in departmental files detailing how TVA had 
been repeatedly informed that its activities were likely to jeopard-
ize the continued existence of the species. But it became evident, 
confirmed by our inside contacts, that when confronted by the po-
litical phalanx of TVA and its allies, the Department of Interior-
35. 42 Fed. Reg. 4868-4869. (Jan. 26 1977). Politically it is not unheard of for 
agencies to narrow their jurisdiction by restrictively interpreting the statutory lan-
guage. EPA interpreted groundwater out ofthe Clean Water Act to avoid that regula-
tory snarl, requiring Congress later to pass the Safe Drinking Water Act. In one 
amusing anecdote, EPA and the Corps each tried to interpret the massive dumping of 
automobile tires into Connecticut wetlands as being within the other agency's CWA 
jurisdiction, each hoping to avoid a problem area with low enforcement appeal, high 
volume, and Mafia entanglements. 
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with 86,000 employees and a budget of three billion dollars-had 
made a conscious decision to rely on us citizens-a motley little 
group of maybe thirty-five activist students, farmers, fishermen, 
and a law professor in the process of being discharged-to enforce 
the federal Act against TVA. 
Into the judicial process. The case went to trial in April of 1986. 
The forum offered by the court, however, was far narrower than 
an environmentalist would have hoped. In this litigation, as in 
many others, the courts at each level strenuously avoided inquiry 
into the practical public merits of the question. To a generation 
steeped in the lore of activist courts stretching to take on major 
public issues, our case was a reminder that the judiciary can just 
as easily incline toward a constricted definition of their role. De-
spite asserting that the subsequent holding was based on a "bal-
ance of equities," the trial court refused to allow any evidence of 
existing project alternatives and allowed us to present only twenty 
minutes of evidence on the reservoir's economics. The judge would 
not defer to Interior's findings that the darter was endangered in 
its critical habitat, so actual proof of endangerment was an impor-
tant part of the case, though he quashed our subpoena for testi-
mony from the expert Interior biologist.36 In any event, the trial 
court ultimately found that the darter was a species endangered 
by the destruction of its critical habitat and that was enough. The 
trial court failed to issue an injunction, but that oversight was rec-
tified on appeal. 
In the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court, given the lack of 
a trial record on the contesting economics and equities of the case, 
we successfully argued Sax's remand to the legislature theory: 
When two contrary statutory directives collide, the job of the 
courts is not to jump in and arrogate to themselves the power to 
strike intuitive bargains, but rather simply to enjoin the violation. 
This legal argument was a political argument as well. No envi-
ronmental plaintiff should want to argue for a legal proposition 
that produces an irrational and irresolvable stalemate. Our argu-
ment was that although the facts were complex, there were com-
36. We had expected that Interior would authorize its biologists to travel to the 
trial to testifY on the accuracy and substantiality of its own listing, but it did not. 
When TVA quashed our subpoena seeking an Interior biologist's testimony, Interior 
required him to take personal vacation leave to come to testifY. It is unusual that 
TVA, the defendant, and not the federal agency being subpoenaed to testify, was able 
to quash the subpoena. It forced the witness to admit that he personally volunteered 
to testifY, which TVA used to imply bias. 
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mon sense resolutions that could be legislated, but not by judges 
who should be passive, not activists. The courts' job was to main-
tain the status quo by injunction, which as a practical matter 
would shift the conflict to Congress where ideally the conflict 
would finally achieve transparency, be debated, and be resolved in 
an enlightened democratic process.37 
Backlash: Defending a Statutory Enforcement Initiative in the Po-
litical Process 
A hot potato in the bureaucracy. Jimmy Carter was inaugurated 
on January 12, 1977, and nineteen days after the outsider neo-
phyte entered the White House, the Sixth Circuit presented his 
young Administration with a very hot potato in the form of the 
injunction blocking Tellico Dam for violating the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. The newspapers and broadcast media seized on the case, 
covering it as an example of environmentalism gone nuts, wonder-
ing how the new administration, with a President who had run as 
a citizen environmentalist, would handle it. Would the adminis-
tration, with the powerful momentum that comes from a fresh 
election victory, back us and the ESA and change the political to-
pography of the case? Some improvements seemed inevitable. 
The Schedule C political appointees whom the President chooses 
for the top ranks of the Cabinet agencies and the White House's 
voluminous staff could make a marked difference in policy formu-
lation and agency planning for statutory implementation. A wave 
of environmentalists was moving into the top ranks of the federal 
agencies, including Cecil Andrus, an environmentally progressive 
Governor ofldaho named Secretary of the Interior, and Gus Speth 
of the Natural Resources Defense Counsel and Marion Edey of the 
Environmental Policy Center named to the President's Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ). Within a year Carter was also 
able to name a new member to the three-person TVA Board. 
But the nature of the executive branch is such that merely 
changing the head does not necessarily change the mind of the 
organism. Interior may have had a more environmentally em-
pathic leadership, but that may actually have weakened the De-
partment's political position, because the anti-regulatory bloc in 
Congress identified the new people as threats. This message was 
soon received by Secretary Andrus. As far as we could see the 
pressure came from a number of his own divisions which included 
37. See Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), affd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); SAX, 
supra note 27, at 151. 
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several pork barrel agencies, from outside where the political 
pressure from lobbyists and members of Congress was starting to 
be intense, and also from within the agency's vast ranks of civil 
service careerists. It came as well from other federal agencies who 
feared their programs might face serious legal difficulties from an 
activated ESA, agencies like the Department of Agriculture (Agri-
culture) with its linkages to pesticide programs and its Forest Ser-
vice timber cutting programs, and the Department of Transporta-
tion with its interstate highway construction program. The Act 
was a grenade, Andrus realized, that could destroy his policy aspi-
rations and tenure in office. Within a week he was making public 
statements expressing tentative approval of the Ford Administra-
tion's proposed regulations defining the Act's coverage to extend 
only to future actions, not to ongoing projects like Tellico Dam. 
This hesitancy was understandable in bureaucratic survival 
terms. The civil service and the top officials of Interior undoubt-
edly cared about the ESA as well as the agency's many other mis-
sions, but the Act's application to ongoing projects represented the 
kind of political landmine that could severely hurt the Act as well 
as the Department in general. 
The Iron Triangle. Why was it so politically daunting for an 
agency to enforce one of its own keynote statutes, we wondered? 
"It's an iron triangle problem," said Fred Pow ledge , a public policy 
writer who came to one of the American Rivers citizen participa-
tion workshops.38 "The Department of Interior is up against a 
number of powerful iron triangles, and the water projects triangle 
is one of the strongest." What is an iron triangle? Powledge ex-
plained it was a political science term for specialized political alli-
ances that take root within the federal government. Iron triangles 
have three corners-one within the agencies, one within Con-
gress, and the third deep in the marketplace. In the water project 
area you have an agency like TVA or the Corps that desires the 
power and momentum that comes from building a public works 
project with federal funds. Then in Congress you have the pork 
committees and individual members of Congress who gain power, 
votes, and campaign contributions by bringing infusions of federal 
taxpayer dollars into their local districts. The third bloc is made 
up of all the special interests that profit from the projects or pro-
38. See F. POWLEDGE, WATER: THE NATURE, USES, AND FUTURE OF OUR MOST PRE-
CIOUS AND ABUSED RESOURCE, 286-87 (Farrar, Straus, 1982), in which the author 
gives Prof. George "Rock" Pring, now of the Univ. of Denver Law School, credit for the 
"iron triangle" metaphor as applied to water project pork barrels. 
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grams, which in the water project boondoggles includes the busi-
nesses that get the federal construction contracts, other industries 
like barge transportation or irrigation businesses that in effect get 
their operations federally subsidized for free, real estate interests 
that can make windfalls by selling land to the agencies at a profit 
or getting free improvements to land they own, state and local pol-
iticians who are given the opportunity to run development boards 
or get to choose winners and losers in the details of project design, 
chambers of commerce whose members will make money from the 
windfall infusions of federal cash, and so on. It's a symbiosis. 
All three corners of an iron triangle promote and protect each 
other-a virtually unbeatable combination focused on launching 
projects and keeping them rolling. A triangle, remember, is the 
strongest geometric shape there is. The culmination of hundreds 
of such projects forms a cohesive political structure, a national 
Iron Triangle on public works construction built into the heart of 
the governmental system. And the water triangle has analogs in 
other areas of government. There are iron triangles for mining, 
ranching, timber, transportation, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, de-
fense, and a host of other sectors. Many are linked together 
through the appropriations process; others are formed through the 
seduction or "capture" of regulatory agencies. None of them are 
fond of environmentalists. 
The mushroom syndrome. We saw a good example of iron triangle 
pressure in the regulatory setting with the United States Forest 
Service in the Department of Agriculture. Agriculture had been 
one of the agencies expressing concern about endangered species 
enforcement. Carter appointed Rupert Cutler, whom we had 
known as a professor of environmental policy at Michigan State 
University, to be an Assistant Secretary. He invited us to come 
over to discuss the ESA. ''You remember how you came to my 
classroom last fall?" he asked. "I had forty-five students. Now I 
have 20,000 employees in the U.S. Forest Service directly under 
my command." We discussed how he could, among other policy 
initiatives, integrate endangered species protection planning into 
the management of the national forests. But Cutler's brains and 
hard work within the Forest Service came up against coordinated 
resistance within and outside his agency. A year later he was car-
ried out of the office on a stretcher with exhaustion and bleeding 
ulcers. As he later explained, "I couldn't budge my own bureau-
cracy. They treated me like a mushroom. You know what I mean? 
They kept me in the dark and fed me a lot of manure." 
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It helps to have environmental groups, an Ol' Girl Network, and a 
friend in the White House. As it turned out, Interior's policy was 
reversed, in part at least through the fortuity that we were given a 
political introduction to the nascent Old Girl Network. The envi-
ronmental groups in Washington had greeted our case's arrival 
with mixed enthusiasms, but most of them39 ultimately provided 
advice, logistical support, and hundreds of hours of lobbying effort 
for the ESA over the last three years of our fight. Their help was 
critical. Their sophisticated presence in Washington had clearly 
made a difference in assuring that the environment is seriously 
considered in the daily politics of the capital. They gave us con-
nections as well as support in lobbying. Through Anne Wickham, 
Conservation Director of Friends of the Earth, we were given an 
entree to a nascent 01' Girl Network and soon connected with a 
woman who was one of Andrus' top aides, so that the full facts of 
the Tellico impasse began to be communicated to the Secretary 
directly. 
Even more important, Wickham introduced us to several peo-
ple on the White House staff, particularly Kathy Fletcher who was 
working in Stuart Eizenstadt's Domestic Counsel. With the aid of 
these staffers the Tellico case in all its ecological and economic 
details became a White House case file. After the President had 
been briefed, we were told, his good 01' Georgia buddy who was 
chief of liaison with Congress, Bert Lance, exclaimed to Carter "I 
hear they're talking about stopping that dam for a little minnow." 
The President replied sternly, "I can't think of a better reason!" an 
answer that was heartening to us as an indication of his personal 
feelings, if not his understanding of the full facts of the case. We 
had put a great deal of economic detail into the Domestic Council 
case file to show the Administration that this purported example 
of irrational environmental extremism could be reversed 1800 and 
used by the Administration to demonstrate that good ecology 
makes for good economics. We thus hoped the Carter people 
would use the facts of our case to validate not only the ESA, but 
other environmental initiatives of the Administration as well. Af-
ter the intervention of the Domestic Council, doors did begin open-
39. The groups that regularly provided support for us and the defense of the ESA, 
were Friends of the Earth, American Rivers, Environmental Policy Center, Sierra 
Club, National Wildlife Federation, Trout Unlimited, World Wildlife Fund, and De-
fenders of Wildlife. Among our sagest mentors in Washington was 1998 Garrison 
Lecturer Oliver Houck, then General Counsel and Vice President of the National 
Wildlife Federation. 
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ing to us within Interior. Interior's statements to TVA became 
more emphatic. Transplantation away from the river was halted 
completely, and in the congressional hearings in the summers of 
1977 and 1978 the Administration took a position affirming the 
workability of the Act and noting the intransigence of TVA in its 
truncated "consultations" with Interior regarding the dam.40 
The Press. The most significant political consequence of the Sixth 
Circuit's injunction, however, was in the media. From the begin-
ning of the campaign we had hoped that the press would ulti-
mately give the case the perceptive scrutiny and transparent 
public forum it desperately needed. From the moment the injunc-
tion was announced, however, the press focused only narrowly on 
the story, the ironic disproportion ofthe "two-and-a-half-inch min-
now, discovered at the last moment by elitist environmentalists, 
being used to stop a large multi-million dollar hydroelectric dam." 
It did not matter that virtually every element of that caricature 
was inaccurate. The story was too good to pass up. The press 
from the beginning was sucked in by the beguiling cliche of little-
fish-versus-big-dam into consistently framing the story through 
the classically misleading epigram-"It's a tradeoff. You have to 
choose: Will it be economic progress or environmental quality? 
You can't have both." There was no second wave of revisionist sto-
ries revealing the dramatic fact that this dam did not pay, was a 
wasteful federal land development boondoggle, and that the fish 
was saving a valuable natural resource and millions of dollars for 
America. The economic case for the darter never made it to the 
newspapers and television screens of the United States.41 As re-
40. TVA remained truculent. Kathy Fletcher had been instrumental in pushing 
the nomination by President Carter of David Freeman, an accomplished technocrat 
with expertise and energy, who was extensively briefed on the Tellico Project before 
his appointment to the Board. In the event, however, Freeman was a victim of inter-
nal TVA politics, because as one ofthree directors he could not shape policy, and even 
when he was appointed Chairman, he suffered acutely within TVA, his own agency, 
from Rupe Cutler's mushroom syndrome. 
41. Our evolving rap on Tellico had five steps leading to an inexorable conclusion 
that the dam project did not make rational economic or common sense while the op-
tions that preserved the darter did: 
• Endangered species as canaries·in-the-coalmine-under the terms of 
the Act the darter serves here as a sensitive natural indicator of 
human welfare as well as ecology, identifying the threat posed by the 
destructive ill-conceived project to pure, clean, fertile, habitat re-
source values that are of great potential worth to the human commu-
nity as well. 
• Tellico is a recreational and land development project, not a power 
dam. 
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counted elsewhere,42 the force and effect of this media coverage, 
and the fact that it never changed over time, ultimately undercut 
even a presidential veto. 
Working with the executive. Having belatedly come to an active 
support of our position, the Department of Interior, we noted, did 
not know how to use us outsiders in the ongoing political defense 
of the Act, and we had to push to stay within the process. At one 
point, for example, we were permitted to sit in on a planning ses-
sion for the upcoming 1977 Senate hearings, which would be a sig-
nificant opportunity to defend the rational operation of the Act as 
a whole. A review of the ESA over the prior three years would 
probably show, we argued, that there had been dozens of potential 
conflicts between the Act and federal projects over that time, and 
good faith administrative process had crafted win-win resolu-
tions-alterations in technology, timing, scope, location, design, 
and process, as well as developing mitigations, to avoid the con-
flicts. But the agency did not have that data compiled and were 
not sure the task could or should be done. We had to push, and 
the Fish & Wildlife Service finally agreed to give an office and 
phones to two of our law students from Michigan. Mardi Hatcher 
and Deborah Labelle volunteered the first part of their summer of 
1977 pulling together what became the Carter Administration's 
official record of what actually had been going on in interagency 
implementation of Section 7 around the nation. By the end of 
their research, Mardi and Debbie had put together a catalogue of 
more than 4000 cases where field personnel reported potential 
conflicts between the Act and federal agency actions, many of 
• 300 plus farm families are being thrown off their prime agricultural 
lands by federal condemnation to provide acreage for a hypothetical 
Model City that TVA planned to develop with Boeing, a plan that was 
abandoned in 1975 as economically irrational. 
• Valuable river-based project development alternatives exist that would 
save the darter and get the farmers back on their lands, and produce 
far greater recreational, commercial, and tourism development bene-
fits than a dam. 
• TV A, however, consistently refuses to consider any options except their 
original obsolete dam plan that will destroy the darter. 
The conclusion that this analysis aimed at? That the snail darter case demonstrated 
the ESA as a workable law that makes sense, which identifies important opportuni-
ties for necessary adjustments and protections for human welfare as well as wildlife. 
But this analysis never received coverage or scrutiny in the press despite reams of 
fish-dam stories, nor did it penetrate the congressional process that ultimately elimi-
nated the river. 
42. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Law and the Fourth Estate: Endangered Nature, the 
Press, and the Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 ENVTL. L. 1 (2002). 
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them trivial but dozens of them potentially serious. In subsequent 
hearings this bureaucratic record proved to be extremely useful, 
showing that of all those thousands of potential conflicts only 
three had not been resolved,43 all three demonstrating agency ob-
structionism rather than infeasibility of resolution through com-
promise and negotiation. But without the efforts of the two law 
students the Carter Administration would not have had the data 
on regulatory success necessary to defend the rationality of the 
Act and its implementation. 
OMB. Who were those guys? There were, however, moments of 
greater effectiveness on the part of the Administration. At one 
point when the Senate subcommittee had scheduled hearings fea-
turing a dozen federal agencies testifying on the Act, we citizens 
working with the staff and the Administration were worried be-
cause most of the selected agencies were those tied to iron trian-
gles-in agriculture, interstate highway construction, mining, 
grazing, and the like, as well as TVA whose adamant opposition to 
implementation of the ESA was predictable. We asked our con-
tacts in the White House, "Do you realize that this testimony is 
going to be a cascade of federal agencies bemoaning extreme re-
strictions on important national programs?" We were told not to 
worry. Other than TVA's, the statements from all but two agen-
cies had been thoroughly vetted. They would not assert the inflex-
ibility and irrationality of the ESA, as originally drafted. TVA as 
an independent agency and the party in ongoing Supreme Court 
litigation would not be countermanded by the Administration. 
Which two agencies had not been contacted? The Department of 
Transportation and the Forest Service. Later that morning, 
standing in the marble corridor outside the Russell Senate Office 
Building hearing room, we were bemused to watch as two guys in 
gray suits halted three Transportation officials as they strode up 
the hall to enter the chamber. The two guys took Transportation's 
draft statement, held it up against the wall, and with a magic 
marker began to strike out paragraph after paragraph. When the 
process was over the statement had little but a bland opening and 
43. The three cases were the case of a Mississippi interstate highway planned to 
go straight through the nesting area of the Mississippi Sandhill Crane, National 
Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976); a dam in Nebraska that 
would eliminate critical areas of the whooping crane Midwest flyway, Nebraska v. 
Rural Electrification Admin., 1978 WL 23470, 12 ERC 1156, 8 ELR 20789 (D. Neb. 
1978), Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994) (both 
concerning the Grayrocks Dam); and Tellico Dam. 
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closing, with nothing between. The dejected Transportation 
spokespersons, and later the Forest Service witnesses who went 
through the same procedure, could only say to the committee 
chairman that they were authorized to say their agency had no 
quarrel with the public purposes of the ESA in general, they be-
lieved that implementation could be worked out over time to sat-
isfy the different statutory mandates, and they would have to 
provide a clean copy of their statements at a later date. 
Who were those two guys in gray suits? OMB. The Office of 
Management and Budget has a special role in overseeing the 
budget and finagling funding flows among the agencies, projects, 
and programs of government that, despite changes in the congres-
sional budget process, retain substantial leverage for the Presi-
dent.44 When the President's Domestic Counsel decided the policy 
of the Administration was to declare the ESA reasonable, the 
OMB would enforce it with a magic marker against the marble 
walls of Senate corridors if necessary.45 
Hearings can be parades with no destinations. After the agency 
testimony the Senate hearings in 1977 and 1978 opened up a 
parade of witnesses from across the country, and the national 
politics of this issue quickly became apparent. Senator Garn 
would introduce a small family rancher from Utah with fears 
about the Act, Senator Packwood would introduce a small mill 
owner from the Northwest lumber industry, and dozens more 
came to testify against the Act. (It is interesting how the largest 
industries try to find mediagenic little guys to represent their po-
sitions-the widow running a small ranch who fears protected 
wolves eating her calves, the grizzled prospector worrying about 
his grubstake mining claim, the Portuguese fishing family whose 
mortgage depends on evading the quota, the homeowner who 
44. See infra note 71. 
45. This political phenomena was given a further twist when TVA Chairman 
Wagner announced at the beginning of his testimony that the White House had spe-
cifically allowed him to proceed with testimony in opposition to the Act. Junior Sena-
tor Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming reacted with disbelief, asking whether that meant 
that all the other agencies had given censored testimony to the Committee. Wagner 
said that was so, but the rest of the Committee shushed Wallop, indicating to him 
that this was a standard procedure when agencies testified. Agencies, particularly 
those within the President's Cabinet, should be considered declarants of Administra-
tion policy, not witnesses sworn to tell what they really thought to the senators who 
had invited them to testify. See Endangered Species Act Oversight Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Res. Prot. of the Senate Comm. on the Env't & Pub. Works, 92d Congo 
366-78 (1977) (discussion with federal witnesses noting that they can speak directly 
only when directly asked for their real opinions). 
HeinOnline -- 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 457 2001-2002
2002] ENVTL LAW IN THE POLITICAL ECOSYSTEM 457 
claims his house burned because endangered kangaroo rat habitat 
prevented his clearing a firebreak, the under-employed logger who 
fears protections for the spotted owl46-and we of course did too.) 
The National Association of Homebuilders, the pulp and paper in-
dustry, the mining industry, the Edison Electric Institute-the 
hearing docket reads like a roster of the National Association of 
Manufacturers and their lobbying arms. The Pacific Legal Foun-
dation, an industry-funded "public interest law foundation" was 
represented by sleek, silk-stocking attorneys testifying as to the 
intractable irrationality of environmental protection regulations 
exemplified by the Act.47 
The politics of Congressional Hearings in practice did not re-
flect the wistful premises of eighth grade civics textbooks. For us 
observing the political process, perhaps the most important lesson 
of the hearings was seeing what hearings did and did not accom-
plish. Hearings are a type of forum that has no necessary product 
except the fact of having been held. Hearings are not calculated to 
reach a "verdict." They are opportunities for just that, a "hear-
ing." The endangered species hearings in both Senate and House 
produced significant opportunities for us citizens and our allies in 
the environmental movement to present information about the 
logical economic and empathic reasons for protecting endangered 
species. It became clear quite quickly to the Committee staffers 
on both the House Merchant Marines and Fisheries Committee 
and the Senate Public Works and Environment Committee that 
TVA's arguments did not withstand the light of scrutiny, and that 
46. These examples are affecting to hearing audiences, though they often have a 
skewed relationship to actuality. The kangaroo rat story was inaccurate on the re-
cord, more lumbermen would have their jobs under selective cutting than under 
mechanized clear-cutting that most endangers species, etc. 
47. See Amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearing on S. 2899 Before 
the Subcomm. on Res. Prot. of the S. Comm. on the Env't & Pub. Works, 92d Congo 
248--52 (1978); Endangered Species, Part 2: Hearing Before the House Comm. on 
Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 92d Congo 849--56 (1978). This testimony was re-
vealing. Several days before the hearings we had extensive discussions with a Pacific 
Legal Foundation (PLF) attorney in the national office showing that the endangered 
species in the Tellico case was serving as the sole legal protection left for the private 
property rights of farmers living in the valley being condemned for a development 
project that was economically irrational as well as "socialistic" in putting TVA in the 
land sale business. The PLF, we argued, should be on the side of private property and 
economic integrity and against highhanded government agency condemnations. The 
PLF's liaison on the issue, however, while accepting the validity of the data we sup-
plied from TVA and the GAO, sheepishly told us the Foundation could not reverse its 
position based on the facts of the matter, because its political orientation on this issue 
was obliged to be pro-industry and against implementation of environmental regula-
tion under the ESA. Their testimony excoriated our snail darter case. 
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the citizen group from Tennessee had a full and sufficient answer 
to all the allegations leveled against the fish. The trouble with a 
hearing, however, is that the only people who ''hear'' are those who 
happen to be in the room. A committee's hearings do not necessa-
rily attract even a majority of its own members. Sometimes there 
would be only one or two members of the committee dutifully sit-
ting at the dais during the presentations. Given an array of com-
peting opportunities, members choose to come or not based on 
some internal calculation of whether the session will be entertain-
ing or useful to them personally, and once a session is over in most 
cases it is unlikely that anyone in Congress will ever again cast a 
human eye upon the transcript or the written testimony scanned 
into the official hearing record and published by the GPO. 
The Press, again. Likewise the press. It was clear that one of the 
major political functions of a hearing is the hope that it will at-
tract and focus news media reporting on a particular committee or 
issue. Media attention is not automatic. It depends on the 
"hooks" that are presented in the occasion-a big name witness, a 
juicy twist that would be attractive to news audiences, a news cli-
mate building momentum, the infotainment character of the hear-
ing as it unfolded.48 For us living the controversy, there were 
deep pangs of jealousy walking down the corridors of the Capitol 
seeing television cables and phone lines snaking out of the doors of 
hearings deemed by the press to have sex appeal. Strangely, for a 
story that repeatedly was treated as a cultural epigram-little 
fish stops big dam-our hearings, which over time demonstrated 
the solid economics of species protections and the dysfunctionality 
of the case for the dam, did not register the same kind of press 
attention. Perhaps they were a letdown, deflating the easy and 
familiar fish-dam cliche. The press coverage of hearings was er-
ratic. The line up of agencies testifying that the Act was workable 
on the actual administrative record was almost completely ig-
48. We heard about this need from colleagues at Syracuse's Newhouse School of 
Public Communications when we asked them to explain how the press decided what 
to cover in their papers and broadcasts. One said, ''Well, you have really asked The 
Big Question. [Although] the short answer is: Nobody really knows, the 'standard' 
answer seems to be 'Whatever they [or their editor] think their reader/viewer will be 
interested in.'" Most news departments, they said, use some version of a common list 
of factors in deciding what to publish: Conflict, impact, interest (of audience), novelty, 
prominence (people, institutions, etc), proximity, and timeliness. E-mails from Bar-
bara Croll Fought and Patricia H. Longstaff, Professors, Syracuse University, S.1. 
Newhouse School of Public Communications, to David E. Cole, Research Assistant, 
Boston College Law School (July 25, 2001) (on file with author). 
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nored. That was not the story that had the infotainment buzz to 
it. The press did, however, often pick up on piquant anecdotes 
from witnesses brought to Washington by their respective indus-
tries to show more examples of the standard story frame, fish ver-
sus dam, species versus people, environmental protection versus 
economic health. When a potential conflict surfaced in Maine be-
tween an endangered plant and the Army Corps of Engineers' 
proposed Dickey-Lincoln Dam, the press jumped all over the ridic-
ulous-sounding name of "Furbish's lousewort," without focusing 
on the merits ofthe project or the fact that it was the Army Corps, 
not environmentalists, who announced and bannered the possible 
ESA conflict. 
The GAO and Gore of economic review. Frustrated by shallow 
press coverage and lack of success in our attempts to find a forum 
that would produce a convincing verdict on the economics of our 
case, a smoking gun to present to the press, we followed up on a 
sage suggestion relayed to us by Brent Blackwelder, the head of 
American Rivers and the Environmental Policy Center. He sug-
gested we try to get an analytical review of Tellico economics from 
the General Accounting Office (GAO). Like many attorneys then, 
we had never heard of the General Accounting Office, and learned 
that it was an arm of Congress which sometimes produced incisive 
accounting studies of the economics and practicalities of contro-
verted cases if a chairman of a full committee signed a request 
letter for such a study. We drafted a letter for the signature of the 
Chairman of the House Merchant Marine Committee, who said he 
would only sign it if we could get backing from a member of the 
Tennessee delegation.49 
Finding a Tennessee representative who was willing to give 
even just off-the-record backing for a reasonable economic study of 
the merits of a TVA dam proved difficult. We went from office to 
office and finally, under face-to-face exhortation from Tennessee 
law student Hank Hill, AI Gore, Jr., a young freshman congress-
man from middle Tennessee who asserted a strong personal com-
mitment to rational environmental analysis, authorized us to 
convey his oral backing for a GAO study to Chairman Murphy, 
though he would not put it in writing. Waiting in the Chairman's 
office with the unsigned letter in hand, I received the phone call 
from Hill that Gore had given his OK. As I turned to go into the 
49. Territorial localism exists in Congress as well, so that members tend to defer 
to the local turf of House and Senate colleagues. 
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committee hearing room carrying the verbal go-ahead for the 
Chairman's signature, however, an urgent phone call rang onto 
the switchboard. The person who took the call, a staffer whom 1 
knew and liked and who apparently knew and liked us, turned 
with consternation on her face. "I have an urgent message from 
Mr. Gore. He wants Chairman Murphy to know that he has just 
told some Tennesseans they could say he supports a GAO study of 
the Tellico Dam, but he does not in fact want that economic study 
and asks Mr. Murphy please not to issue the request." The staffer 
turned to me and said, "I'll give you five minutes, and then this 
message gets delivered to Chairman Murphy." Dashing down the 
corridor to the committee room, three minutes later we had the 
Chairman's signature. When Gore called Murphy personally later 
that day to ask that he rescind the letter, the Chairman chuckled 
and said he would not. "Those boys from Tennessee beat you fair 
and square, AI." So despite AI Gore's attempt to double back, the 
request letter was honored and GAO prepared the study we had 
hoped would be forthcoming. 50 On its own terms the GAO study 
was everything we had hoped. When it appeared in October of 
1977 it was extraordinarily straightforward, for the first time pub-
licly declaring the economic shortcomings of virtually every aspect 
of TVA's justifications for the dam.51 The Comptroller-General's 
team, reviewing each benefit claimed for the project and the exis-
tence of river-based alternatives concluded that TVA's justifica-
tions for Tellico "do not give a truly valid picture," were 
"statistically weak," and "inflated." The GAO report ended with 
an unusually decisive "Conclusion and Recommendation to Con-
50. In his book, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (Plume 
1993), Mr. Gore unaccountably leaves out any mention of the Tellico Dam case, 
though it was the biggest environmental case coming out of his home state of Tennes-
see in that decade, the most important case under the ESA, and one would have 
thought it a paradigm example reinforcing his arguments about the importance of 
rational overall environmental accounting. 
5l. See COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: 
THE TVA's TELLICO DAM PROJECT-COSTS, ALTERNATIVES, AND BENEFITS, EMD-77-58 
(Oct. 14, 1977) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], the GAO Report requested by Chairman 
Jack Murphy and Subcommittee Chair Robert Leggett of the House Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. The GAO is an agency of Congress itself, not an 
executive agency, established to inform Members of Congress on complex accounting 
issues and beyond. 2 U.S.C. § 601(b)(4) (2000). This forum can be dramatically useful 
to citizens trying to obtain an authoritative confirmation of their analysis of chal-
lenged projects and programs, but the GAO needs to be requested to do a study by 
powerful congressional figures. The Tennessee citizens were able to get the request 
from two committee chairmen through luck, legerdemain, and a small bribe, which is 
another story. 
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gress"-"The Congress should prohibit by law the Authority from 
spending any more appropriations for work on the project that 
would further endanger the darter" or be wasted if the dam was 
not completed, pending an intensive economic rethinking of the 
project.52 
The real lesson of the GAO study for us, however, was not the 
conclusions it drew but the fact that they made no difference-
because they made no media splash. The GAO study, though we 
carried it to press offices throughout the Capitol and tried to focus 
the committees' attention on its dramatic conclusions, was re-
ceived largely with silence. Not even one news story appeared in 
the national press noting the report's dramatic verdict-reversing 
the standard fish-dam story-that this dam project, despite mil-
lions of dollars and fifteen years of work already invested in its 
construction, still could not be economically justified. What we 
sadly discovered was that in official Washington, if the newspa-
pers or broadcast media do not pick up on a story, the story does 
not exist. 
The Supremes. The politics of the case within the Supreme Court 
argument is a story for another day, but a political twist before the 
day of argument showed us that the person and policies of a Presi-
dent are not irrelevant and of no effect. Jimmy Carter had been 
persuaded by his Attorney General, Griffin Bell, that the Depart-
ment of Justice should represent the TVA in the Court. But our 
allies in the Domestic Council pushed Interior Secretary Andrus 
to prepare a counter brief against the Department of Justice and 
TVA. Mter intensive internal negotiations ("This is just like 
Watergate politics," Attorney General Bell fumed53), a devastat-
ing Department of Interior brief countering each of the TVA's ar-
guments was bound into the back of TVA's own brief as an 
Appendix refuting all that preceded it. This meant that the Attor-
52. GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 29, 32. 
53. Quizzed about the split federal voices in his brief, Attorney General Bell said 
during the oral argument, "I do not favor this system. We have one Attorney General 
and one Solicitor General, and I think that ought to be it." Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 30, TVA v. Hill, No. 76-1701 (U.S. April 18, 1978). Bell's response reveals an 
unspoken riddle. What exactly is the role of the Attorney General when he decides to 
represent an agency's position? Is he taking that position as attorney for the agency, 
or as attorney for the entire federal government? Bell seemed to think that, short of 
the President, he as Attorney General or his deputy the Solicitor General should be 
allowed to decide what the position of the entire Administration on the Endangered 
Species Act was to be. That's over-reaching. No wonder Secretary Cecil Andrus re-
acted violently and submitted a counter-brief. 
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ney General went into the oral argument carrying a brief in which 
the federal government argued for us, as well as against us. It 
helped us and the Act, and caused Bell a good deal of consterna-
tion during the oral argument. The pro-ESA split-brief probably 
would never have happened in the Ford, Reagan, or Bush Sr. or 
Bush Jr. Administrations. 
For the citizens, the Supreme Court litigation was a double 
forum, both legal and political. The brief and many points in the 
argument were calculated not only to raise the legal arguments-
primarily statutory interpretation, separation of powers, and the 
proper role of equitable balancing-but also to get across the real 
facts to American public opinion to secure our political position. 
Maybe from the briefs and arguments the public would finally see 
that this was not a hydroelectric project, that it involved massive 
condemnation and resale of private property, eliminating farms, 
recreation, and historical resources. Unfortunately, although the 
first part of the agenda was satisfactorily completed-the Court 
upheld the injunction against Tellico Dam, 6-3-the media never 
got beyond the silly-little-fish-versus-presumably-important-dam 
story. We may have won the argument against the Attorney Gen-
eral in the Court, but he won the news spin in his press conference 
on the Court's front steps, where he waved the little fish in the air 
and said "this is what it's all about, and it's ridiculous." The me-
dia loved it. 
God Squad. After the Court's decision upholding the snail darter 
injunction, Howard Baker and the pork barrel started agitating 
for a legislative override. Senator John Culver-perhaps because 
he liked farmers even though these Tennesseans lived far from his 
Iowa constituents, or to defend his subcommittee's turf, or simply 
to fight for what he knew was right-though he was just a fresh-
man senator, heroically defended the Act against Baker's at-
tempts to water it down and override the Tellico injunction. 
Culver then brokered a compromise ESA amendment with Baker: 
They would create a Cabinet-level Endangered Species Commit-
tee, almost immediately dubbed the "God Squad," with the power 
to override the Act and exterminate a species if three criteria were 
met. The snail darter would be the first case to go into this gaunt-
let.54 We were pleased with the amendment, hoping that it would 
54. See ESA Amendments of 1978. The three criteria were set out in the amend-
ment: 
§1536 (h) ... The Committee shall grant an exemption ... if, by a vote of 
not less than five of its [seven] members voting in person-
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finally produce a highly publicized verdict against the dam, so to 
help assure its passage we opposed it. In that political context, if 
we had supported Culver's amendment Baker might well have 
had second thoughts. If the environmentalists opposed it, how-
ever, it must be good.55 
We approached the day of God Squad judgment with trepida-
tion. We had worked surreptitiously behind the scenes with the 
committee staff (was this ethical?) to build a full record of project 
dysfunctions. By the terms of the amendment, however, the God 
Squad was directed to ignore all the project's sunk costs. If the 
fish and its river were to survive in their natural condition, their 
merits would have to win on today's balance sheet, outweighing 
fifteen years of past expenditures. As the staff analysis of both 
sides of the case came to a close, there was silence and then 
Charles Schultze, Chairman of the President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, cleared his throat. Would he say it's too late to 
turn back now? 
Well, somebody has to start .... The interesting phenomenon is 
that here is a project that is 95% complete, and if one takes just 
the cost of finishing it against the [total] benefits, and does it 
(A) it determines on the record [after a full hearing] that-
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency 
action; 
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alter-
native courses of action consistent with conserving the species or 
its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest; 
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance ... 
Later a fourth criterion was added in part in response to TVA's behavior on Tellico: 
(iv) neither the federal agency concerned nor the exemption appli-
cant [after having received notice of the risk to the species] made 
any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resource .... 
The original text of the first three exemption criteria were drafted by a non-attorney 
staffer who serendipitously had taken our course in Environmental Law for under-
graduates and graduate students at the University of Michigan. 
55. Our position was consciously disingenuous, given our continually eroding 
opinion of legislators. But we argued in effect "Don't take these tough decisions away 
from where they belong in Congress, the democratically appropriate forum, and put 
them into an expert executive review panel. Oh please, Br'er Fox, please don't throw 
us in that there briar patch!'" Despite our attempts to explain to Culver that our 
stalking horse stance positioned him as a centrist in the compromise, the senator took 
offense, blistering our position paper on the God Squad-which said it was "another 
unneeded bureaucratic committee, if Congress would take its hearings seriously." A 
journalist who was shadowing Culver during this time reported his fury that "the 
press releases went out saying [his God Squad compromise] was a know-nothing at-
tack on the ecosystem." ELIZABETH DREW, SENATOR, 33 (New York, Simon & 
Schuster) (1978). 
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properly, it doesn't pay! Which says something about the origi-
nal design!" [applause]56 
The God Squad voted unanimously to deny the exemption and up-
hold the Tellico Dam injunction based on economic grounds. Al-
most as unanimously, however, the newspapers and broadcast 
media, which had bannered the fish-dam cliche as the lead story 
when the Court issued its decision based on the fish, ignored the 
dramatic revisionary verdict showing that the ESA and the darter 
lawsuit made solid economic sense. Their silence proved fatal. 
A forty-two second appropriations rider. To our sorrow, we soon 
learned about "riders." From January to mid-June, nothing hap-
pened. The Carter Administration was off balance trying to cope 
with Panama Canal turmoil, attempts to repeal the Department 
of Education, pork barrel assaults on the President's water policy, 
and smoldering opposition to his outsider politics. David Free-
man, Carter's TVA appointee was incapable, for reasons of per-
sonal style it seemed, of working with us to get farmers back on 
the land or to publicize the project's defects and the attractive al-
ternative developments available for the river valley, all of which 
would have dramatically changed his and our political context. 
And then we learned about riders. Late in the afternoon of 
June 18, in the almost-empty House chamber, the appropriations 
committee slipped a brief amendment onto the water and energy 
funding bill without allowing it to be read out loud.57 Although it 
56. See supra note 12. 
57. 125 CONGo REC. H-15301 (June 18, 1979). The House was officially in session, 
but very few members were in attendance, with the exception of the Appropriations 
Committee members who all were sitting together as a series of appropriations bills 
for power and water development were being brought to the floor. A representative 
from New York made a short speech about avoiding nuclear hazards. The docket then 
shifted to the TVA appropriations. Rep. John Duncan of Tennessee took the lectern. 
"Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment." The clerk began to read "on page 28, line 18, 
strike the period and insert '; provided, not withstanding the provisions of .... '" At 
this point, Duncan broke in, "Mr. Chairman! Mr. Chairman! Mr. Chairman!," to 
waive the reading of the amendment's text. The Speaker pro tern turned to the com-
mittee members sitting on the floor, and asked "is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Tennessee?" Rep. Myers of Indiana stood, and said "the minority has 
reviewed the amendment and accepts it." Chairman Bevill stood and added that the 
Democrats had "no objections to the amendment." The Chairman called the question 
on the amendment that had not been read. The committee members called out "aye." 
No one else in the chamber knew what was going on. There were no nays. "The ayes 
have it." In forty-two seconds, six years of our citizen litigation had effectively been 
reversed. The full text ofthe amendment overrode all laws that might block construc-
tion of the Tellico Reservoir, not just the Endangered Species Act, and ordered that 
the reservoir be completed forthwith. The actual truncated reading of the amend-
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was not discovered until the Congressional Record came out the 
following morning, in those forty-two seconds that rider effectively 
reversed six years of our labors in the agencies, courts, congres-
sional hearings, and the unique forum of the God Squad. (Ten 
seconds later the committee similarly overrode a central provision 
of Carter's water policy, nullifying the Water Resources Council's 
authority to review the economics of all subsidized federal public 
works projects.58) 
We tried desperately to get the snail darter rider stricken 
from the Christmas tree appropriations bill, but the pork barrel's 
political superiority to the Administration was becoming sadly ev-
ident. In a sharp letter sent to all 535 members of the House and 
Senate, Secretary Andrus reminded them that they had appointed 
him Chair of the special seven-member Committee to scrutinize 
the Tellico Dam, and the Committee had unanimously found "on 
the basis of economic considerations alone, the project is not justi-
fied."59 On this record, Andrus said, "I intend to urge the Presi-
dent to veto the ... bill if the language on Tellico remains ... " and 
"I strongly urge [you] . . . to strike the Tellico language from the 
bill."60 
But Congress, though it has nearly peremptory power in func-
tional terms of day-to-day dominance of the political life of the fed-
eral government, does not operate on factual merits but on 
political merits. Its insider players, internal deals and alliances, 
and selective perspectives of self-interest dominate its day-to-day 
actions. As our motion to strike the rider came to a vote in both 
chambers (an accomplishment in itself), appropriations committee 
members worked the floor with Howard Baker and House Major-
ment and the voice votes can be heard on the Library of Congress tape of that date, 
and on a video clip in the possession of the author. 
58. Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat 497 (1979). 
None of the funds appropriated under this paragraph may be expended 
by the Water Resources Counsel for the review of ... any pre-authorized 
report or proposal, or any pre-construction plan ... for a federal or feder-
ally assisted program or a related land resources project or program un-
less funds for these purposes are [specifically] authorized to be 
appropriated by Congress in a statute enacted after the date of enactment 
of this Act. 
In other words, unless the pork barrel committees gave special funding to scrutinize 
their projects, which would not occur prior to Hell freezing over, the Water Resources 
Council was forbidden to scrutinize them. 
59. Letters from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus to Members of the House 
and Members of the Senate, July 16, 1979 and July 27, 1979 (copy on file with Pace 
Environmental Law Review). 
60. [d. 
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ity Leader Jim Wright, saying a "No" vote was obligatory to save 
the Congress's traditional logrolling public works system. The 
factual public merits of the case were not the issue, but rather the 
political merits of the pork barrel. The darter and the river lost by 
100 votes in the House and narrowly in the Senate.61 
Note the political reality: Virtually every member of Congress 
knew from Andrus's authoritative letter that the dam's claimed 
merits were objectively false and the environmentalists' case was 
economically and rationally sound. The appropriations commit-
tees, like TVA, presumably had known this from the start. But 
the majority of members tilted against the darter and the Act for 
their own internal institutional reasons, and the only question 
was whether anything could force a majority nevertheless to vote 
on the actual facts. What might have induced them to follow the 
civic merits of the issue?-a realistic threat that an informed pub-
lic would perceive what they were doing. 
Deeply distressed, we realized that the issue was not what the 
congressional majority knew about Tellico and the ESA. It was 
that the congressional majority knew that America did not know 
the merits of the case, and probably never would, so they could 
vote the accustomed insider game with impunity. 
Ending with a whimper. So now it was a veto game. The darter's 
defenders and our NGO allies throughout the Washington conser-
vation community, along with Secretary Andrus, began a cam-
paign to obtain and uphold a veto of the hill. Carter was to make 
his decision on the afternoon of September 25, then board Air 
Force One to fly to meetings with civic and community leaders in 
New York City. With an hour to go before his departure, Carter 
had decided to veto the bill, and drafted a veto message for its 
release. The Domestic Council notified us to be ready for a call 
and to start preparing publicity on the veto. With the help of Dick 
Ottinger and other stalwarts in the House, we had lined up 163 
votes to sustain the veto, solidly more than the 145 required. 
With a veto, maybe at last America could be brought to see the 
facts. We waited anxiously. Two hours later we got a call patched 
through from the presidential plane. "Deacon is calling." "Hello, 
Professor Plater? I understand you have been working on this 
matter and wanted you to know I have decided it is best to ap-
61. House Roll Call No. 427, 125 CONGo REC. H21,987-22,Oll (Aug. 1, 1979) (TVA 
wins 214-184 [36 abstentions)); AI Gore voted against the darter, Newt Gingrich for; 
Senate Roll Call Vote No. 269,125 CONGo REC. S23,863-272 (Sept. 10,1979) (TVA wins 
48-44 [8 abstentions]). 
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prove the appropriations bill as it stands." To my angry remon-
strances that ensued he repeatedly said that signing the bill was a 
concession he felt forced to make "because the Appropriations 
Subcommittee Chairman is insisting on this rider .... 1 think 1 
am doing the best 1 can for the environment on this .... This is 
not an issue on which we can prevail."62 
The Press, again. Later that fall (while pursuing yet another un-
successful attempt to save the darter and the river by bringing a 
constitutional lawsuit to overturn the statute on First Amend-
ment Native American freedom of religion grounds63), we learned 
what had apparently happened in Carter's head that day. Friends 
in the White House reported to us that just before the President 
boarded the helicopter to fly to Andrews Air Force Base for the 
trip to New York, Frank Moore, Carter's fellow Georgian and chief 
of liaison with Congress, had come into the Oval Office. "I hear 
you are planning to veto that bill with the TVA rider in it?" ''Yes,'' 
Carter reportedly said. "The bill undercuts our environmental 
program and all the work Andrus's Committee put into this 
thing." "Mr. President, you cannot veto this bill. If you do, you 
are going to wake up tomorrow and in the papers all you'll see is 
editorial cartoons of you holding a Snail Darter in one hand and a 
Killer Rabbit in the other. You can't afford that kind of press."64 
Carter yielded, judging that even The President of the United 
States in a pointed veto message could not get this endangered 
species success story through to the American people. 
The significant audience, it finally was clear to us, was not 
the President and not the Congress. President Carter, a particu-
larly weak executive, nevertheless reflected the general vulnera-
bility and dependence of the modem chief executive toward the 
power and volatility of Congress. And the actions of Congress 
62. Personal Notes of author, 9:30 p.m. (Sept. 25, 1979) (on file with author). Why 
did Carter bother calling? Apologies, with a deep desire for forgiveness, we were told, 
were part of the way he operated. 
63. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), affd, 620 F.2d 1159 
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). 
64. The killer rabbit reference is to a story that had come out in the press mocking 
Carter for being attacked by a swimming rabbit while fishing in the South one day on 
a vacation from Washington. See, e.g., Kenneth Bredemeier, Carter Told to Yell 
"Shoo" at Rabbits, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1979, at A5; Henry Mitchell, Any Day: Animal 
Animus and The Ripper Rabbit, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1979, at Cl. Editorial cartoons 
were regularly mocking Carter's diminishing political strength and his inability to 
command media respect. 
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showed us that for public interest advocates the most practical 
constraint on Congress was the coverage and climate of the press. 
But in the Tellico Dam case, the political process was able to 
ignore the public merits of the controversy-ultimately finessing 
the snail darter through a business-as-usual maneuver ofthe pork 
barrel's inside game-because even though the case was getting 
lots of stories, those stories pictured it as a frivolous excess of 
hyper-technical environmentalism. Thus, the insider pork barrel 
was able to fly beneath the radar of the public's awareness. The 
public never heard even a hint that the snail darter injunction 
might make economic sense. When America heard that the dam 
would be completed, it was greeted as a rational outcome, long-
expected, too-long delayed, finally applying common sense to envi-
ronmental extremism. (And to the end, the people of East Tennes-
see never heard that they could have had far more and better 
development in the valley, keeping the river and the farms as 
well. Today, TVA's Tellico reservoir is matter-of-factly taken for 
granted as the only alternative that was available. What is, is.) 
The denouement of the snail darter saga obviously was dis-
mally frustrating to those who, after such a long painful odyssey, 
had brought the dramatic facts to the highest official forums of 
government only to be crushed. For many, especially the farmers 
who had fought so long and now must watch wealthy resort subdi-
visions developing on their lands and motorboats cruising back 
and forth past their old barn silos sticking forlornly up from the 
shallow reservoir in the middle of the project area, the bitterness 
does not blunt much with time. But it is important to understand 
that in no other nation in the world could a little band of citizens 
so lacking in money, political power, and tenure, have been able to 
raise their issue to the highest levels of government.65 And we 
learned a lot. 
Why hadn't environmental law prepared us for politics? In the 
course of our six years in Washington my students and I learned a 
lot we had not known, but it was bemusing to realize how na'ive 
we were when we arrived. I had studied environmental law with 
the best, and yet our coping with the practical politics of everyday 
65. On the other hand it could more lugubriously be noted that in no modern 
industrial democracy besides the USA, probably, could a contested case once brought 
to such a high level of official process, with such a decisive public record of the pro-
posed project's dysfunctional diseconomies, nevertheless ultimately be overridden so 
cavalierly by legislative sleight of hand in a callow uncomprehending media climate 
mired in infotainment. 
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practice in government, and our sense of where it all fit, was based 
on shot-in-the-dark guesswork, sage advice on the spot from a dis-
parate range of volunteer mentors, and a pastiche of 1960s im-
pressions drawn from people ranging from Nixon and Nader to 
Abbey and Dylan. 
One cannot expect environmental law training to produce ad-
vocates ready to cope with the full sophistication of Capitol Hill 
politics in state and national government. But we could prepare 
our students to recognize the underlying structures and phenom-
ena. They could understand the existence of political realities 
that we needed to know-the shadowy dons of the appropriations 
process and the pork barrel, the mass of extraneous suasions and 
deterrents to agency action, the importance of having spooks on 
the inside, lobbyists, the political leverage of subcommittee chairs, 
the GAO, the fact that civic merits do not necessarily determine 
governmental outcomes, the extraordinarily decisive potential 
power of the media to shape public opinion and the impression of 
what public opinion will be, iron triangles, outsiders and insiders, 
the functional omnipresence of the marketplace Establishment-
all these and dozens more were revelations we had to discover and 
learn to handle by luck, happenstance, or bitter experience. 
Why do we teachers so often avoid directly addressing these 
realities despite the fact that we understand their functional im-
portance? In part it may be that we think it important to separate 
law from politics for the sake of our aspirations for a society ruled 
by principles rather than human whim. As Bruce Ackerman 
anguished in another setting, "my entire academic career ... has 
been one long struggle against the view that law is just politics." 
To acknowledge the politics in law risks a "renaissance of legal 
nihilism in our nation's law schools, which will slowly erode gen-
eral confidence in the system."66 We fear that by talking about 
the hulking reality of politics we will obscure the fragile vine of 
the evolving pretensions of the rule of law in our field. So we pre-
tend that the Emperor is wearing clothes. We shy away from 
teaching the hurly-burly of practical politics, perhaps, because we 
regard it as difficult to do and not at all a high calling. In many 
law school settings, moreover, we seem reluctant even to teach 
policy and theories of government, perhaps flinching from predict-
able accusations of political correctness. Universities are the 
66. See Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, 12 AM. PROSPECT 3 (Feb 12, 
2001), available at http://www.prospect.org/prinW12/3/ackerman-b.html (a despair-
ing plaint after analyzing Bush v. Gore). 
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place where such explorations must be undertaken, for where else 
will they be done?, but we mostly leave them to the political sci-
ence departments. We want to avoid the criticism that the legal 
academy represents a skewed partisan alignment. Like the 
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) we confront a field which in 
elective reality has quite a clear partisan division. The LCV nur-
tures and cherishes its opportunities to support environmentally 
progressive Republicans because the LCV's annual legislative 
scorecards show so few members of the GOP at the environmen-
tal-protection end of the spectrum. Where the congressional GOP 
typically has scores averaging less than 20%, and its leadership 
close to 0%, the Democrat's average is above 80%, with its leaders 
at 83%.67 
And then there is the Cassandra syndrome. We are like the 
sad daughter of Troy's King Priam who was cursed with seeing 
the truth, but none would believe her when she foresaw danger for 
her polis lying within the belly of the huge horse on wheels. Many 
of us in environmental law, a field that so vividly illuminates 
large systemic issues, do not relish the foreseeable prospect of be-
ing regarded as chronic dismalists if we repeatedly point to the 
systemic shortcomings of our society's central institutions. Better 
just to focus on structures and doctrine. 
But there is a real need for us to try. From a more articulated 
integration of political considerations, macro and micro, would 
come not cynicism but a broader and more realistic recognition of 
the structures and challenges with which we and our students 
must live and work-including the chess game of daily govern-
mental life, human nature in all its rich complexity, environmen-
tal citizenship and the role of an informed and engaged citizenry, 
the Press's critical role as public information system and forum for 
policy debates, the systemic importance of campaign finance re-
form, opportunities for encouraging the corporate responsibility 
67. In the 2001 League of Conservation Voters' Scorecard, for example, Demo-
crats in the Senate averaged 82% and Republicans 9%; Democrats in the House aver-
aged 81% and Republicans 16%. The senior Democratic leadership averaged 84% in 
the Senate and 83% in the House; the senior GOP leaders averaged 0% in the Senate 
and 0% in the House. The highest GOP legislator was Rep. Connie Morella of Mary-
land with a 93%. There were 72 Democrats with scores of 100%. There were 128 
Republicans, no Democrats, with scores of 0%. LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, 
2001 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCORECARD 6, 8-10 (2002) (copy on file with Pace En-
vironmental Law Review). This fascinating annotated statistical abstract is available 
annually at www.lcv.org. 
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movement, the virtues of transparency (a term many of our stu-
dents have never even heard), and so on. 
How to integrate a practical perspective on politics into the 
teaching of environmental law? That's a conference topic in itself. 
There are promising ways to open up the way we teach the field. 
Beyond the judicious use of instructive legal war stories, many of 
us have been discovering the creative utility of using complex sim-
ulations of environmental regulatory problems as a practical way 
to open our students' eyes to the intertwined realities of environ-
mental law and politics. Negotiation role-playing, field trips to 
real life controversies, case study practicums. The talking-head 
model oflaw teaching is long past due for an overhaul, and on that 
path the realities of environmental law practice will tend to give 
the recognition of daily politics a legitimate place in the next gen-
eration of environmental law teaching. For starters, it would be 
good to get the phenomenon out on the table.68 
III. Stepping Back: An Overview of Societal Governance 
The Four, Five, or Six Branches of National Government 
In the course of the six years of our fish-dam campaign, just 
as we learned that the practical workings of government were per-
meated with political processes to a degree we had not previously 
appreciated, we also came to view the overall structure of govern-
ment in a very different light.69 
68. I diffidently note that ours is the only environmental law casebook that 
straightforwardly addresses the central relevance of understanding the "contending 
forces" in the political sphere around an issue, and directly states its bias (for trans-
parency and citizen participation) from the beginning. See PLATER ET AL, NATURE, 
LAw & SOCIETY, supra note 29, at xxxvii, 29--32, 88-89. 
69. Our multi-branch analysis and the need for more sophisticated civics aware-
ness both are echoed in a recent Boston Globe op-ed piece: 
In the old days ... students learned how a bill became a law (a descrip-
tion that bore almost no resemblance to the way it really happens) ... and 
the three branches of governing (leaving out two other important Wash-
ington power centers, the interest group and the media). No matter. Civ-
ics is on its way back ... In truth, civics education may be an idea whose 
time has come (again), and it may be a topic that, after the Sept. 11 ter-
rorist attacks, is welcomed by liberals and conservatives, regardless of 
their views on the role of government in American life ... "The demo-
cratic process requires knowledgeable citizens who can read and write, 
but also be active," says [State Senator Richard T. Moore], who also 
serves as president of the Massachusetts chapter of the American Society 
for Public Administration. "Without them, it doesn't work. Without 
them, only a select few play a role in government. Without them, the 
squeaky wheels will have power, but the ordinary citizens won't." ... It 
used to be implied that everyone had large citizenship responsibilities 
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The judiciary, the presidency. Which branch of government, for 
instance, is dominant? Arriving in Washington we knew it was 
not the courts. The judicial branch was crucial to our effort but 
clearly had only an adjunct role in finalizing this and most public 
policy issues, especially those lacking a clear constitutional ques-
tion. We initially assumed that the President was the power 
center, and when we gained contacts within the Carter White 
House staff we thought that a decisive corner had been turned. 
Long before the whimpering denouement of the apologetic phone 
call from Air Force One, however, we had discovered that a Presi-
dent has only such political power as he can pull together issue by 
issue. Momentum helps, and neither the Ford nor the Carter 
presidency ever had much of that, but in any presidency it seemed 
to us there is little a President can count on accomplishing by bare 
fiat. 
JUDICIAL BRANCH 
JUDICIARY 
THE "MARKETPLACE" BRANCH 
CHART ONE: THE 5 OR 6 FUNCTIONAL BRANCHES 
OF GOVERNMENT7o 
and should be participating," [says Richard Niemi, A University of Roch-
ester political scientist). "Maybe we've gone overboard by trying not to 
preach. We're at a different extreme now. We have to get back to 
balance." 
David M. Shribman, Bush's Civics Proposal May Provide Students with First Case 
Study, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 2002, at A3. 
70. As noted in the impressionistic analysis presented in the text of this essay, the 
"executive" branch practically can be divided into "Schedule C" agency officials who 
are political appointees serving at the pleasure of the chief executive, and the vast 
majority who are Civil Service employees serving despite Administration changes, the 
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The executive branch, the administrative branch. As Chart One 
implies, in functional terms the President is not even in charge of 
all that is typically referred to as "the executive branch." Just 
consider the name of the office-merely the "preside-ent." The 
President does control his personal staff and the men and women 
who serve at his pleasure at the very top ranks of Cabinet and 
other dependent agencies, and he retains substantial budget 
power, although far less than formerly. The vast majority of the 
federal government, however, should more properly be referred to 
as "the administrative branch." Independent agencies like TVA 
and many others are only casually under his authority, their lead-
ers appointed for fixed terms, thereafter dismissible only for 
proven incompetence or moral turpitude, and their budgets are 
now determined by Congress as much as the White House.71 But 
even within the Cabinet agencies themselves we realized that the 
vast bulk of agency staffers, as Civil Service employees, were like-
wise scarcely dismissible, and that the agencies had ponderous in-
ternal cultures that plowed along irrespective of changes in 
administration. The degree to which a President's political ap-
pointees in Cabinet agency leadership positions made a difference 
seemed to correspond to how well they as individuals fit each 
agency's internal culture as it existed in the administrative 
branch. Due to iron triangles and in some cases outright capture, 
agencies like the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
or particular divisions like the Forest Service in the Department 
"administrative" branch. As argued in the text, two further powerful "branches" are 
the Fourth Estate, the Media, and the political-economic Marketplace, which may be 
the most dominant branch of all. Chart assistance credit: Joan Shear. 
71. In 1974, responding to many Members' displeasure with Richard Nixon's at-
tempts to impound appropriations for several programs he did not favor, especially 
highway and environmental programs, and the fact that Presidents effectively mo-
nopolized most of the budget-formulating process, Congress enacted the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.88 Stat. 320 (effective July 12, 
1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 680 (1997). The Act grew out ofa 1967 report by Lyndon 
Baines Johnson's Presidential Commission on Budget Concepts that appeared only 
shortly before LBJ left office so Johnson never had to face the shift of power down 
Pennsylvania Avenue that the reforms accomplished. The 1974 Act established pro-
cedures for Congress to develop its own draft annual congressional budget. It created 
the expert Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and standing committees in both 
chambers devoted solely to the Budget. These committees and the CBO then estab-
lished strategic technological parity with the President by purchasing their own com-
puter, a prosaic act that some would say had constitutional consequences. See 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, 2 U.S.C. § 680 (1997), as 
amended. For background see also BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFfER, POLITICS 
By OTHER MEANS: POLITICIANS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE PRESS FROM WATERGATE TO 
WHITEWATER (W.W. Norton ed., 1999). 
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of Agriculture, both of which were unenthusiastic about the ESA, 
might well be more aligned with the industries with which they 
worked than with the President, especially a reform-minded Pres-
ident who wished to change the agency's fundamental course. 
The congressional branch. So, adding the legislature, that makes 
four branches of government, and of these four Congress clearly 
seems to be pre-eminent. The political chips a President has to 
pull together to build a prevailing position on an issue are prima-
rily tied to Congress. If Congress cuts appropriations, refuses to 
vote a desired bill out of committee, threatens awkward hearings, 
or makes any of many other moves in its arsenal, executive initia-
tives can be stalled in their tracks. Since the departure of LBJ 
and the arrival of the congressional Budget Committees with their 
own budget-drafting computers,72 the White House's presumption 
of pre-eminence has disappeared. If the calculus of Washington is 
built on power, and power is based on how much a player can hurt 
or help you, then it appeared to us that Congress, especially in its 
senior members, is courted and feared the most. 
The Media branch of government. But we discovered that Con-
gress itself courted and feared yet another structure of the politi-
cal process that apparently could wield sharper peremptory power 
even than they. It's the Press. Although we were never privileged 
to receive the kind of incisive journalistic coverage that could have 
changed our fortunes in the legislative process, we were repeat-
edly amazed by how reporters on other issues were treated as 
fearsome potentates, and how a series of dramatic and revealing 
press stories could quickly change the tone and outcome of a pub-
lic policy debate. 
The Press is so important and so potent a part of the govern-
ance process that it too deserves recognition as a branch of govern-
ment, and that makes five. On Chart One the Media Branch is 
denoted by the fog-like presence drifting around the other 
branches, omnipresent, thought to be daily shaping and embody-
ing the public opinion of the nation, providing a major part of the 
informational grist upon which the other branches (perhaps even 
the courts) base their actions, erratic, but always ready to con-
dense in sudden storm clouds of focused coverage. 
The Marketplace branch of government. But, we ultimately de-
cided, there is another branch of national government more omni-
72. See generally note 71 on Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act 
of 1974. 
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present and powerful than these five. It's what we came to think 
of as the political-economic "Marketplace." The marketplace has 
arguably always been the most powerful "government" of Ameri-
can life. It can be argued that the marketplace economy was in 
fact the true driving force of the Revolution that cut us off from 
colonial rule and set us off on our manifest destiny march of con-
quest across the continent. The Thirteen Colonies had matured as 
a separate market entity and so "like ripe fruit" they dropped 
away from Great Britain. Still today the marketplace is far more 
powerful than any other in governing the daily life of the nation, 
intimately shaping the lives of each of us, supplying or withhold-
ing an array of goods, services, and behavioral options. The press, 
which we saw wielding such power over the players of govern-
ment, is still, when you get down to it, part of the marketplace in 
the business of selling news and infotainment. 
Wherever we went in Washington we found the organs of gov-
ernment responding with instinctive attention to the marketplace 
interests and coalitions involved in each issue. Interior under-
standably flinched when it realized that the ESA would throw it 
into confrontation with the marketplace coalition of economic and 
political forces that was the Tenn-Tom pork barrel. Interior, like 
other departments, instinctively responded in all its various sub-
departments to the array of industry networks it connected with-
mining, grazing, water supply, oil and gas, transportation, power, 
irrigation, timber, pulp and paper, fishing, homebuilding, urban 
construction, and many more, many of which were in the parade 
of witnesses from industry and commerce who appeared in con-
gressional hearings and corridors lobbying on the ESA. 
In the iron triangles we observed throughout government, 
from Southeastern water projects to national forest timber cutting 
in the Pacific Northwest, it appeared to us that the marketplace 
element of the triad was dominant. The agency was the vehicle 
for federal participation in construction or subsidies, and the con-
gressional sponsors were critically important in obtaining project 
and program authorizations and appropriations. But the engine 
that drove both was the linkage to the marketplace players 
outside government that generate payrolls, campaign contribu-
tions, local and national economic activity, vote-enhancing public 
relations. The marketplace economy seemed to us a powerful la-
tent presence, the mass and momentum of which undergirded and 
affected most of the daily business of the official entities of govern-
ment. The federal government may be a tiger (and we often felt 
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like a mere flea on that tiger), but we decided the tiger was riding, 
with its claws mostly sheathed, atop a lumbering elephant. 
By thinking of government through the expanded rubric of six 
branches we could make more sense of the processes and players 
that we encountered over our six years in Washington. In our 
case we had to operate in all six branches, but in doing so it was 
important to have an orienting sense of the interactions, of what 
each could and could not do, of where power lay and how to ad-
dress it. 
Beyond the Multiple Branches of Government: A Societal Construct 
of Three Economies 
The assertion that social governance proceeds in six different 
"branches," however, does not provide a conceptual construct of 
the political whole sufficient to explain the place of environmental 
law. To make that further step, I invite consideration of a model 
used with my students for several years, built upon the idea of an 
"economy of nature" floated by Joe Sax in 1993.73 For better or 
worse it seems appropriate to seek a holistic societal construct 
within the rubric of "economics" rather than "law," and the hy-
pothesis I am asserting is that we live in not just one economy, but 
simultaneously in three. 
The marketplace economy. The construct begins with the huge 
compound mechanism that most people primarily are thinking of 
when they speak of "the economy." Let's call it the "marketplace 
economy," and by that phrase I do not mean just the world of bus i-
ness, but the vast behavioral system beloved of the Chicago School 
comprised of millions of individualized daily decisions of corporate 
and individual actors, private and public entities. The market-
place economy is the dominant structure of human and govern-
mental actions, an immensely powerful network of networks, a 
system of interconnecting systems. It makes sense, in Chart Two, 
to picture the marketplace as the central figure, dominating the 
daily life of the three economies' societal cosmology. The intercon-
necting rings within it represent the dynamic energy of its net-
73. See Joseph Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1445 (1993); see also 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and the Three Economies: Navigating a 
Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in which Everything is 
Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 359 (1999); Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater, The Three Economies: An Essay in Honor of Joseph Sax, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 411 
(1998). 
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works of interconnecting systems, and not coincidentally echo the 
international logo for a nuclear fission reaction. 
The Economy of Nature 
CHART TWO: THE THREE ECONOMIES74 
The marketplace economy is the most powerful, intimate, 
highly articulated, self-energizing human system ever invented, 
probably including religion. Public agencies as well as corpora-
tions are major integral components of the market economy, as 
TVA and many other federal actors demonstrate. It is naIve to 
74. Another impressionistic illustration. As noted in the text of the essay, it re-
quires three intersecting economies to accomplish a fully realistic economic analysis 
of most issues of environmental law. The Marketplace Economy is the dominating 
dynamo of the society, at least in the short term, dealing with everything that can be 
reduced to market pricing and its equivalents, and traded. The Marketplace takes in 
resources and other inputs from the Economy of Nature and the Civic-Societal Econ-
omy, and directly or indirectly passes its excesses and negative externalizations back 
into the other two economies. Government and law are interposed as a protective 
buffer around the Marketplace, with varying degrees of effectiveness, to protect peo-
ple, culture, Nature, and other diffuse values from "market failure" situations where 
the Marketplace Economy undercuts or insufficiently serves societal welfare. 
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think of any maj or sector of the marketplace economy, for instance 
energy, without thoroughly incorporating the internal dynamics of 
iron triangles and agencies like Department of Energy, the Bonne-
ville Power Authority, TVA, FERC, Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, state utility board politics, and so on. 
The marketplace economy's elaborate synapses for brokering 
motivations and payoffs have built breathtaking wealth and tech-
nological power for modern society. But for all its dynamism, the 
marketplace economy has several tragic flaws. Every entity in the 
marketplace economy basically tends to deal only with things that 
have some form of price tag attached, where benefits or costs are 
registered and accountable, and each entity also shares the same 
tragic logic of cost externalization so well known by environmental 
lawyers, so that wherever possible each entity tends to externalize 
social costs out from the domain of the marketplace economy and 
into no-man's land. When combined in huge multiple networks, 
the effect of this inclination is to externalize vast amounts of pol-
lution and other disruptive costs into the natural economy and be-
yond. Absent a regulatory environmental accounting, pollution 
goes into the air and the nearest water bodies. Rivers, valleys, 
forests and farms are officially regarded as cheap and handy 
materials for supporting make-work pork barrel projects that al-
low iron triangles to remain potent. 
The economy of nature. If you are going to conceptualize "econom-
ics" as a major part of a society's self-governance, it makes sense 
to posit and picture-in addition to the dynamic, interconnected 
mechanisms of the marketplace economy-an "economy of nature" 
as well, a separate economy representing the physical context 
upon which the marketplace is built, where resources come from 
and where many of the market's externalized costs go. 
An economy of nature really does exist. Like the marketplace 
economy, it is a complex system of systems, even more intricately 
connected and complex than the marketplace economy in the way 
it processes the elements and forces within and imposed upon it, 
brokering and buffering inputs and disruptions through its cycles 
of water, carbon, energy, and interconnecting ecosystem functions. 
The marketplace economy takes resources and services from the 
economy of nature, and sends back to it pollution, resource dero-
gation, and disrupted ecosystem dynamics. The economy of na-
ture gives and takes, and is forced to adjust as best it can. 
But natural resources and services have hugely significant 
value even if they are unacknowledged or undervalued by the 
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marketplace. Robert Costanza and his colleagues have analyzed 
the multi-trillion dollar values of "natural capital," the resources 
and services provided free or far below their true value, without 
which the marketplace and human life would be impossible.75 
And the costs that are externalized from the marketplace 
economy do in fact go somewhere. The ultimate reality is that 
everything has consequences. Many externalized negatives are 
passed back into the economy of nature with critically significant 
consequences to natural systems-pesticides shutting down bacte-
rial soil-building, ecological disruptions from human-caused cli-
mate change, loss of forests, wetlands, prairie. The costs impacted 
into the economy of nature do not just disappear out of sight out of 
mind. Nature is not a sink. A river that isn't there anymore isn't 
there anymore. 
The civic-societal economy. But a construct of just two econo-
mies-with the economy of nature added to the familiar market-
place economy-does not adequately capture the full range of 
societal dynamics, values, and externalized costs that launched 
environmental law in the first place. Environmental law did not 
begin exclusively nor primarily as a defense of nature. The 
images that launched the environmental law revolution in the 
1960s were of pollution directly impinging upon human health. 
Where, in the construct of two economies, do the utilitarian 
human consequences of the marketplace economy get repre-
sented? Asserting the existence of an economy of nature is not 
sufficiently persuasive to prod politicians and others deeply en-
trenched in the blandishments of the marketplace economy to 
broaden their perspectives. Our political players are likely to re-
gard this "economy of nature" as an intangible, insubstantial aca-
demic figure of speech that does not impinge on the daily economic 
75. Robert Costanza and Herman Daly have led the Natural Capital analysis, and 
come up with impressive numbers: 
We have estimated the current economic value of 17 ecosystem services 
for 16 biomes, based on published studies and a few original calculations. 
For the entire biosphere, the value (most of which is outside the market) 
is estimated to be in the range ofUS$16-54 trillion per year .... Because 
of the nature of the uncertainties, this must be considered a minimum 
estimate. Global gross national product total is around $18 trillion per 
year. 
Costanza et aI., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 
NATURE 253 (May 15, 1997); see also PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: THE 
COMING EFFICIENCY REVOLUTION (1998); Robert Costanza & Herman Daly, Natural 
Capital and Sustainable Development, 6 CONS. BIO. 37-46 (1992); Paul Hawken, Nat-
ural Capitalism, MOTHER JONES, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 40. 
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and political realities in which they live. If you talk about the 
"natural economy" you sound like a tree-hugger. 
So we need to picture a third concurrent economy, incorporat-
ing elements outside the marketplace economy, like the economy 
of nature, but representing a universe of more direct human utili-
tarian self-interests. I would unpoetically call this the "civic-socie-
tal economy." Externalized costs that are passed out of the 
marketplace into nature often simultaneously or subsequently 
pass on directly or indirectly into the interconnected networks of a 
human societal economy as well. This occurs with industrial pol-
lution, some of which goes directly into humans' bodies. Workers, 
for instance, have absorbed dangerous levels of solvents into their 
blood and endocrine systems while working in unregulated facto-
ries,76 and a host of other largely unaccounted human social costs 
also occur when such solvents are dumped in a river killing or al-
tering a hundred kinds of plant and animal life forms, cutting 
back on fishing harvests and recreation, lowering property values, 
changing human qualities of life in terms of aesthetics, health, 
and collateral economics. The civic-societal economy represents 
human values and quality of life that the marketplace does not 
adequately value-a stable, secure low income mixed neighbor-
hood, a sunset, a fishable swimmable watercourse, the cultural 
richness of communities and places. In the Tellico Dam case, go-
ing beyond the economy of nature, shouldn't one be able to con-
sider the civic human value of a family farm community that had 
been settled here for 200 years? And the societal value of the re-
gion's last stretch of big, clean flowing river, the nation's oldest 
continuously-inhabited locale with 10,000 years of prehistory, the 
ancient heart of the Cherokee nation, a blue ribbon trout river 
turned to dross, the moral reverberations of consciously con-
signing a rich, unique ecosystem to extinction? 
When you chart the dynamics of all three economies you find 
them deeply interconnected, with all three necessary to a realistic 
description of how our society functions in its natural context. Na-
ture is not "outside" our human economy or our jurisprudence.77 
76. The Allied Kepone case is the classic example that helped launch the federal 
water pollution control act amendments. See PLATER ET AL., NATURE, LAw & SOCIETY, 
supra note 29 at, 39-54. 
77. Professor David Westbrook has expressed some frustration at the difficulty of 
defining a coherent philosophy of environmental jurisprudence. He tried to build a 
liberal conceptual overview upon the perspectives of individual human rights, collec-
tive aggregated rights, and markets, but was unable to fit some sectors of environ-
mental law into those realms. Norms protecting endangered species, for instance, 
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Human social dynamics and civic values are not reducible to 
marketized balance sheets. Thus if you are an economist purport-
ing to tell the nation how it should make production and govern-
ance decisions, you are naIve or a crook if you do not consider costs 
and benefits within all three economies. You cannot rationally 
decide how to produce and apply a chemical, propose to clear-cut 
federal subalpine forests, mine a mountain, pass a fast-track 
agreement exalting global trade, or build a dam, without weighing 
the consequences in all three economies. 
Where is government in the three economies? Theoretically, of 
course, our legal system periodically recognizes the importance of 
the second and third economies. Statutes and regulatory systems 
are primarily created to correct private and public failures in the 
marketplace economy-addressing the marketplace's dysfunc-
tional impacts upon the other two spheres. Schematically, then, 
we can best conceive of government as strategically positioned 
around the perimeter of the marketplace economy, looking in. Al-
though much of government is created to facilitate the functioning 
of the marketplace, the core objective of most regulatory entities, 
programs, and societally protective statutes, including most in the 
environmental field, is to attempt to mitigate and control the ex-
cesses of the marketplace. Thou shalt not throw carcinogenic 
chemicals into the natural environment, nor destroy forests or 
wetlands unless you can substantially recreate them, nor expose 
vulnerable populations to substances that pose metabolic hazards, 
seemed to come from an alien, less human-centered domain. See generally David A. 
Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 V.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619 (1994). 
As he has commented: 
Most of our law may be (must be) articulable in some liberal language. 
But the Endangered Species Act cannot be, not really .... At some point 
liberalism's concern for the internal (autonomy, choice), fails to capture 
environmentalism's sense of the external (ecosystems, nature, etc.). At 
the end of the day, you cannot explain the outside in terms of the inside." 
Posting of e-mail message from dwestbro@acsu.buffalo.edu to envlaw-
profs@darkwing.uoregon.edu (Nov. 6, 2001) (Copy on file with Pace Envi-
ronmental Law Review.). 
Conceptualizing the existence of three interlinked economies, however, helps to clar-
ify that environmental jurisprudence operates on the realistic foundation that there is 
no external outside. Environmental law's high purpose and aspiration is to make 
sense of the First Law of Ecology, that everything is connected to everything else. 
Environmental law, like all law, ultimately must function in the real world, a world 
made up of multiple interlocking systems. We humans individually and collectively 
are indeed significant components of many of these multiple systems. But we are not 
hermetically set apart from the systemic elements and networks that do not operate 
on our own terms, just as we are not disconnected from the consequences of our own 
actions. 
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nor tear down the cultural treasures of the past for insubstantial 
short-term reasons. 
Carbon control rods, and the processes that erode them. If nuclear 
fission is a workable metaphor for the powerful interconnections, 
reactions, and drive of the marketplace economy, as suggested in 
Chart Two, then perhaps government statutes and regulatory pro-
grams should be conceived of as a system of carbon control rods, 
civic constraint mechanisms consciously inserted from the perime-
ter into the midst of the marketplace sphere in which the poten-
tially cataclysmic phenomena reside, in order to moderate and 
control the powerful systems' destructive tendency to run wild. In 
environmental law and elsewhere, agencies and statutory pro-
grams typically are legislatively created and imposed upon the 
marketplace in moments of vividly perceived market failures, to 
correct them for the future. Disasters to humans and to nature 
like Love Canal, the Kepone incident, the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, 
and whooping cranes on the verge of extinction create momentary 
transparency for marketplace situations otherwise obscured from 
public recognition, and from them we get statutes like the Com-
prehensive Environmental Resource Conservation and Liability 
Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, a strengthened 
Clean Water Act, Oil Protection Act of 1990, and the Endangered 
Species Act. 
But the metaphor goes further. From the moment they are 
inserted, control rods are embattled by the very forces that re-
quired their imposition, and, unless they are maintained, strength-
ened, and renewed, over time they tend to deteriorate. When the 
moments of vivid public concern that created them dim into retro-
spect, civic enactments coming from outside the marketplace econ-
omy lose some of their sustaining force. When the generative civic 
moment passes, the daily realities of the iron triangles and mar-
ketplace forces that created the problems necessitating civic con-
trols in the first place begin to erode the control mechanisms. 
Consider the sad, real-world record of governmental regulation of 
mining, logging, overgrazing, overfishing, chemicals in our food 
chains, and at how the ESA's protections for the last natural popu-
lation of our endangered fish were erased by the Tellico Dam. 
The politics of resistance against civic regulation. Observing the 
political reaction that rallied against the snail darter injunction, 
we came to see it within the context of a much larger process of 
resistance to governmental regulation. Understandably, major 
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players within the marketplace economy coordinate and interlink 
themselves into networks of lobbies, trade organizations, and 
other coalitions designed to promote and protect the self-interest 
of their industries. A broad resistance to the imposition of exter-
nal regulatory controls is a natural inclination, and from it a wide-
spread national anti-regulatory movement has resurged in the 
past twenty-five years. The breadth of reaction revealed in the 
ESA hearings included lobbying and testimony from the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable, the Pa-
cific Legal Foundation, the homebuilding industry, Edison Elec-
tric Institute, Chemical Manufacturers Association, ranching, 
mining, corporate agriculture, pulp and paper industries, and 
many more. 
The tone of the political debate often cast the snail darter as a 
representative of much more than the endangered species issue. 
It was an opportunity to trivialize and undercut regulatory gov-
ernment in general. Direct attacks on air or water pollution stat-
utes can be politically dangerous. The images that then come to 
the public's mind are of vulnerable humans choking for breath or 
drinking water sources choked with sludge and dead fish. But the 
images summoned by endangered species protection, on the other 
hand, do not evoke the same depth of human concern. The ESA is 
broadly supported by the public, Senator Baker's aide admitted to 
us, but, he smiled, "although it may be a mile wide it's only an 
inch deep." If he and his allies could depict endangered species as 
conflicting with human welfare, the public would come to realize 
that this and other environmental regulations were too severe. 
Viewing the politics of environmental law through the per-
spective of the snail darter and the three economies suggests a 
spectrum of different processes by which the marketplace operates 
in all the branches of government and national life to resist the 
imposition of various civic-societal regulations. Iron triangles, 
agency capture, media and public opinion campaigns, agenda-
driven judicial appointments, the creation of industry-oriented 
"public interest law firms" and academic foundations,78 a well-
78. Lewis Powell prepared a memorandum for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
shortly before he went onto the Supreme Court. In it, he decried the creeping social-
ism dominating America, as exemplified by civil rights, consumerism, and environ-
mentalism, and he called for business to begin funding academic and representational 
programs and foundations to counteract the 1960s ideologies in American society. 
The Powell Memorandum led directly to the founding of the Heritage Foundation and 
other similar initiatives. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, Attack On American Free Enterprise System (August 23, 
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funded "Wise Use" movement, regulatory erosions argued as nec-
essary for global trade. Anti-regulatory initiatives can be tracked 
in such disparate settings as national environmental education 
association conventions79 and industry-funded Montana junkets 
providing more than forty percent of the nation's federal judges 
with week-long free vacation resort seminars on how the ESA and 
other environmental statutes are economically unwise and 
unconstitutional. 80 
In the judicial context, the marketplace anti-regulatory 
agenda can be tracked in the evolving jurisprudence of the federal 
judiciary as it has been reshaped over the past twenty years be-
ginning with the Meese-Sununu years of judicial appointments.81 
In the legal process context, generally there are five sectors of po-
litical initiative that have been deployed with varying success over 
time to undercut regulatory effectiveness. Cutting back on citizen 
enforcement is one important strategy, as the Supreme Court's 
current majority has sought increasing limits on citizen standing, 
and agencies and Congress craft procedures where discretion 
reigns and clear-cut violations are harder to establish.82 Doc-
1971) (Copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Review.). See also Oliver Houck, 
With Charity for All, 93 Yale L.J. 1415 (1984) (analyzing how industry has created 
and financed "public interest law firms" as "charitable organizations" to promote busi-
ness interests against governmental regulation in the public interest). Law-and-eco-
nomics professors have reportedly received funding amounting to tens of millions of 
dollars to develop the impressive current corpus of pro-business academic justifica-
tions for the dominance of marketplace dynamics. 
79. See Thomas Harvey Holt, Growing Up Green: Are Schools Turning Our Kids 
Into Eco·Activists? REASON MAGAZINE, October 1991, at 37-40. 
80. See Joe Stephens, Judges' Free Trips Go Unreported, WASHINGTON POST, Fri-
day, June 30, 2000, AI; Ruth Marcus, Issues Groups Fund Seminars For Judges, 
WASHINGTON POST, Thursday, April 9, 1998, AI; COMMUNITY RIGHTS COUNSEL, NOTH-
ING FOR FREE, How PRIVATE JUDICIAL SEMINARS ARE UNDERMINING ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTIONS AND BREAKING THE PUBLIC'S TRUST (July 2000) at http:// 
www.tripsforjudges.org/crc.pdf (last visited June 23, 2002) accessed through 
www.communityrights.org. 
81. See generally William E. Kovacic, The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental 
Policy: The Impact of Appointments to the Federal Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 669 (1991). 
82. The Laidlaw decision in the Supreme Court is one of very few recent cases 
upholding citizen standing. The trend is overwhelmingly in the opposite direction. 
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167 
(2000). See generally PLATER ET AL., NATURE, LAw & SOCIETY, supra note 29, at 
398--418. 
The five main sectors of current anti-regulatory legal initiatives are: 
I-Restricting Citizen Enforcement: The post-'60s pluralism that built envi-
ronmentallaw on the foundation of the civil rights, anti-war, and consumerist move-
ments, likewise focused on citizen action and citizen law enforcement. If citizen 
enforcement is blocked, then many regulatory laws will be ineffective, and "Iron Tri-
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angles"-made up of regulated industries, supportive legislators, and suborned agen-
cies-can continue to dominate in the traditional insider-politics fashion. Severe 
constraints have increasingly been placed on citizen enforcement by legislative riders 
and judicial holdings, particularly in the area of standing to sue. The Supreme 
Court's 2000 Laidlaw decision somewhat abated the siege against citizen standing, 
though the 2001 Sandoval decision illustrates the continuing effort to constrain citi-
zen suits. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Enviornmental Services (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167 (2000); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
2-Devolution: Efforts in courts and legislatures to recapture regulatory powers 
from the federal government and recommit them back to the states. This effort has 
utilized a selective "federalist" argument picking up and going beyond earlier states' 
rights arguments targeting federal civil rights enforcement. It builds on the "divide-
and-conquer," "race-to-the-bottom" political logic that if regulation ofthe marketplace 
is devolved to 50 different legal systems, the efficiency and impact of regulation over-
all will decline. Recent manifestations include Bush administration suggestions that 
determinations on required degrees of pollution control should be shifted back to the 
states that best know their own situations, and recent Supreme Court decisions like 
Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC that cut back the scope offederal regulatory jurisdic-
tion. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S., 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 531 U.s. 159 (2001). 
On the other hand, when states are more protective of health and environment 
than the federal government, putative states' rights advocates may shift to pre-emp-
tion arguments. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (state 
hazardous waste occupational safety and health training standards impliedly pre-
empted by OSHA); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) 
(plaintiffs tort claims impliedly preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); 
Cippilone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992) (Scalia dissent urging that all 
state tort claims for cigarette-induced injuries are impliedly pre-empted by federal 
statutes); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481 (1987) (holding that the Clean 
Water Act pre-empts Vermont's tort suit against a New York polluter's fouling ofVer-
mont waters); U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding state restrictions on hazards 
of oil tanker spills pre-empted); Rush Prudential v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 2171 
(2002) (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy dissenting against majority holding 
that federal statute does not pre-empt state health care patients' rights); see also E.J. 
Dionne, "Conservatives Use States' Rights as a Pretext," NEWSDAY, June 26, 2002 at 
page A29. 
3-Delegation challenges: The "non-delegation" doctrine (arguing that a statu-
tory delegation of power to an agency for a particular action is void because it was not 
done properly) is recurringly used, selectively, in judicial review attempts to curtail 
regulatory actions. The non-delegation doctrine has been used extensively in state 
judicial review of administrative actions, and had been repeatedly urged on the Su-
preme Court by Justice Rehnquist in certain environmental cases, starting with the 
Benzene regulation case in 1980. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum 
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (the "Benzene" case). The Court's 2001 American Trucking 
decision, however, backed away from asserting a heightened delegation standard for 
federal judicial reviews of administrative actions. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). In some settings, however, the same forces that make 
statutory delegation challenges against strong federal agencies will advocate defer-
ence to the decision of agencies that see the regulatees' side of things. 
4-"Re-inventing Government"-Applying Cost-Benefit· Risk analysis as 
a prescriptive standard for regulatory decisionmaking, (overriding the "P" 
Principles: The Precautionary and Polluter-Pays Principles): This initiative is re-
flected in attempts to establish "market·based regulation," market-oriented cost-ben-
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trines of deference and devolution to the states undercut the fed-
eral matrix that built environmental law, although in selected 
cases where states regulate more stringently than the federal 
agencies, the strategy shifts 1800 toward federal pre-emption of 
state regulations.83 Reinvigorating the doctrines restric~ing the 
delegation of power to agencies is another strategy enforced selec-
tively, alternating with the doctrine of deference to agency deci-
sions in cases where agencies are more accommodating to 
marketplace requisites. Efforts to imply market-based cost-bene-
fit-risk analyses as a prescriptive standard for regulatory decision 
making are a fourth strategy, incorporating an inherent bias in 
favor of costs that can be accounted in the marketplace economy 
and discounting values in the natural and civic spheres. Property 
rights and regulatory takings challenges constitute the fifth sector 
of anti-regulatory initiative, with the doctrine of inverse condem-
nation pushed to unprecedented extremes in attempts to chill and 
reverse environmental regulations that impose costs on the 
marketplace. 
The anti-regulatory initiatives can be discerned throughout 
the different branches of government and public policy debate, 
and tends to color how we conceive of the proper role of govern-
ment as a whole. At times, as during the Gingrich revolution of 
efit formulas, and risk analysis as determinative procedures in setting and enforcing 
regulatory standards domestically and abroad. Although it has had powerful effect in 
many lower court decisions as well as national legislative policy, the Supreme Court's 
American Trucking decision backed away here too from asserting a fundamental legal 
role for cost-benefit-risk analysis. 
5-Regulatory Takings Challenges: The constitutional claim that government 
regulation that "goes too far" in its impact upon private business enterprises will be 
void, or held to be compensable. The definition of the extent of private rights, of pub-
lic rights, and of when a regulation goes "too far" is an intensely political process, in 
which private rights initiatives currently are strongly in the ascendancy. Uncertainty 
about how private property rights will be weighed serves to chill new regulation as 
well as encouraging state and local courts to broaden the scope of required compensa-
tion for existing regulations. The Court's Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra cases are the 
latest window into the judicial politics of regulatory takings. See Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002). 
83. Our credible modern environmental protection law grew through the leverage 
of "cooperative federalism" schemes providing uniform federal minimum regulatory 
standards, blocking the interstate race to the bottom. See PLATER ET AL., NATURE, 
LAW & SOCIETY, supra note 29, at 309-313. That the race to the bottom divide-and-
conquer strategy is real, despite a good deal of recent wistful revisionist denial, one 
need only consider the core attempts in the 104th Contract with America Congress to 
neuter environmental law by shifting it back to the states. See generally DEAN Mc· 
SWEENEY & JOHN E. OWENS, THE REPUBLICAN TAKEOVER OF CONGRESS (St. Martin's 
Press, New York) (1998). 
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the 104th Congress or in many opinions expressed by Justice 
Scalia or Rush Limbaugh, government is depicted as a barely le-
gitimate necessary evil, a junior partner to the marketplace.84 
I suggest that we need a re-conception of government as more 
than a supportive partnership with the marketplace, though part-
nership is fine as far as it goes. If government is neutralized as an 
effective long-term mechanism for asserting and implementing 
public values, however, then the power of the marketplace be-
comes unconstrained. It becomes a system where the impulses 
that have produced the crashes of some of the world's largest com-
panies characterize the daily governance of the society. The mar-
ketplace economy resists the fences and carbon rods of govern-
ment, but it necessitates them, or we will find ourselves less a na-
tion state than a network of economic warlords. Current bulletins 
from Afghanistan show that is no prescription for a sustainable 
society. A system driven by essentially individual motivations 
without a concurrent societal ethic internalizing civic community 
principles is a recipe for disaster, environmentally and beyond. 
Aristotle himself seems to have recognized this. In the Poli-
tika, I have been told, the classic phrase which is usually trans-
lated as "Man is a political animal" can also be read in Greek to 
say that "[A hu]man is an animal who lives within a polis." The 
polis was the Greek city-state, the aggregation of individual citi-
zens in a communal relationship with shared civic rights and re-
sponsibilities that carried Athens to its democratic heights. If our 
modern society is to shepherd the extraordinary accomplishments 
84. This perspective also casts doubt on some of the more extreme assertions 
about an era of government-industry partnership as a "third generation" of environ-
mental law. By the 1980s it may be that the framework offederal pollution laws had 
generally become accepted by the marketplace, shaping internal industry planning 
and giving rise to the small but vital secondary sector of pollution control business. 
But how does one then explain the 104th Congress? The dramatic events of the Con-
tract with America Congress in 1994 vividly demonstrated that the inherent instinct 
of the marketplace to unshackle itself and externalize social costs had not disap-
peared. Because industry was able to capture the House of Representatives, its 
Project Reliefproceeded to push bills overturning a broad swath of protective environ-
mental and social welfare laws. Species protection listings under the Endangered 
Species Act were subjected to a year-long statutory moratorium. Entrepreneurial 
human nature had not been reversed by years of industrial accommodation to envi-
ronmental regulation. Had it not been for the bravery in particular of Republican 
Senator John Chaffee of Rhode Island, Chair of the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee, many more corrosive statutes would have been passed in the 
104th Congress, and we would not today recognize the landscape of environmental 
law. May he rest in peace. And ifit recurred today, who would stand before the storm 
that might again be unleashed? 
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it has achieved to date, and enjoy a sustainable basis for main-
taining and nurturing humans and their planetary environment 
over generations to come, then it must continue to be character-
ized by an Aristotelian recognition of the essential and legitimate 
role of civic government as well as the dynamism of individualized 
enterprise in the marketplace. 
Coda. As I have demonstrated, it is easy to become grandiose and 
didactic in the attempt to define where environmental law fits into 
the societal cosmology. In more prosaic terms, however, we are 
left with the question of how to integrate political realities, struc-
tures, and contexts into the way we approach and teach environ-
mental law. The enterprise is undoubtedly easier at the level of 
increasing our students' awareness of everyday practical politics. 
We should not hesitate to expose our students to practical simula-
tions of complex regulatory cases and judiciously chosen war sto-
ries, scoping out the broad range of players and the different 
structures and networks in which they play. Such revealing 
glances and anecdotes can induce practical political savvy and so-
phistication in law students who too often still assume that the 
eighth grade civics book is a sufficient descriptor of the way envi-
ronmental law and their own careers will function through the 
years. 
On the grander scale, we all consciously or unconsciously for-
mulate an internal construct by which we understand the compo-
nents, functions, and structures of society and its governance. For 
better or worse this essay offers the suggested construct of a legal 
process and a system of governance functioning in the context of 
three interconnected economies uniquely well illuminated by the 
ongoing evolution of environmental law. Humans, corporations, 
markets, and the disparate segments and systems of the natural 
environment-these are not dissociated individual islands float-
ing in a vacuum. They all exist in a web of direct and indirect 
interconnections, and environmental law in its focus on sus-
tainability is the progressive conservative jurisprudence that 
takes on all of that as its territory. 
Viewed from this perspective-a perspective shaped by our 
battles for the snail darter, the river, and the Endangered Species 
Act-the coming years of environmental law undoubtedly will con-
tinue to track the ongoing evolution of modern democracy. 
